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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that EU environmental policy has become increasingly important, the 
EU member states are struggling to comply with environmental legislation decided on 
the European level. Interestingly, some member states seem to find it more difficult 
than others. This thesis seeks to explain the cross-national variation in non-compliance 
with EU environmental law, that is, why some member states violate it more frequently 
than others. In order to explain such variance in non-compliance, this thesis draws on 
two prominent approaches in the compliance literature: the enforcement approach, 
which emphasizes member states’ willingness, and the management approach which 
stresses member states’ capacities to comply. The findings of this thesis suggest that 
these two approaches should be combined and not treated separately to maximise their 
explanatory power. Politically more powerful member states with weak or moderate 
government effectiveness tend to breach EU environmental law more often than 
politically weaker member states with moderate or strong government effectiveness. 
Moreover, member states with low government autonomy are more likely to breach 
EU environmental law, even though government effectiveness seems to mitigate these 
negative effects to some extent. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Despite the fact that the environment has become an increasingly important policy 
area within the European Union (EU), the member states are struggling to comply 
with EU environmental law. Officially, one of the basic objectives of the EU is that it 
“shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth […] and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment” (Art 3 TEU, 2007). The high ambition within this policy area has 
resulted in a vast amount of legislation at the European level. At the time of writing, 
the environmental acquis communautaire, meaning the laws, rules and procedures 
governing environmental policy, encompasses over 500 legislative items and represent 
a substantial body of progressive and far-reaching environmental legislation 
(Dragneva, 2011: 78). Moreover, by being active and promoting these issues in the 
global arena, the EU has managed to carve out an international role for itself within 
this policy field (Lenschow, 2015: 320ff).  
However, behind the scenes the EU environmental policy faces a litany of 
problems that reduce its impact on the environment. Perhaps the most severe one is 
the big gap between the policy making output and implementation, commonly referred 
to as the “implementation gap” (Milio, 2010: 3). Previous research shows that the 
member states are fairly successful in negotiating new environmental legislation at the 
European level, but despite the severity of the issues, difficulties arise when an attempt 
is made to implement the legislation (Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Börzel 2000; Bursens, 
2002; Börzel 2003; Nimmo Smith et al, 2007; Borghetto & Franchino, 2009; Dragneva 
2011; Buckley, 2012; Börzel & Buzogany, 2017; Spendzharova & Versluis 2017; 
Zhelyzkova et al, 2017).  
The latest implementation review conducted by the European Commission 
(Commission) confirms what earlier research has found, namely that the member 
states are still struggling to comply with EU environmental law. It states that the legal 
and practical implementation within the EU is not uniform, consistent and effective, 
with serious shortcoming in key areas such as biodiversity, water, waste and air (EC, 
2017a). In 2016 alone, the Commission initiated 284 infringement proceedings against 
different member states for failure to comply with EU environmental law (EU, 2017b). 
In fact, environment is the policy area with the second highest number of violations 
of EU law, and it includes some of the least complied with pieces of EU legislation 
(Börzel & Bogdany, 2017: 1). 
When looking more in detail at how well the different member states are doing in 
terms of compliance with EU environmental law, the picture becomes even more 
intriguing. National compliance with EU environmental law is not uniformly poor 
across EU-28, even though all member states are lagging behind to a certain degree. 
Instead, the picture is patchy which substantial cross-national differences. As an 
illustrative example, from 2012 to 2016, the member state with the worst compliance 
record – Greece – infringed EU environmental law 13 times more than the best 
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complier – Lithuania. In a similar vein, Spain breached EU environmental law 11 times 
more than the Netherlands (see section 2.3). Consequently, it seems as if some member 
states are more inclined, or capable of complying with EU rules than others, which is 
the puzzle that this thesis aims to disentangle.  
Complying with EU environmental law brings certain costs, since laws needs to be 
transposed, implemented, applied, enforced, and investments need to be made (Jans 
& Vedder, 2012: 139). However, non-compliance also brings tangible costs to the EU, 
its member states and the environment. First, social costs are imposed on the member 
states through an explicit Commission strategy to “name and shame” non-compliers 
by issuing press statements and publishing scoreboards of compliance (Tallberg, 2002: 
617). Second, the Commission has the legal right to impose significant financial 
sanctions on the member states for breaching EU law. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, non-compliance has a strong negative effect on the credibility and 
effectiveness of EU environmental law. If the EU acquis communautaire is not fully 
implemented, as it is found in this thesis, the EU environmental policy risks becoming 
a “paper tiger” with little effect on environmental quality (Jordan, 1998). Already today, 
member states’ failure to comply with EU environmental law brings immense costs to 
the environment and human health. The Commission estimates that non-compliance 
costs as much as € 50 billion a year in health costs and direct costs to the environment. 
Moreover, delayed or inadequate implementation results in regulatory uncertainty for 
industry and puts in questions the level playing field of the single market. The benefits 
of implementing the existing legislation would bring substantial advantages to the 
European industry. For example, in the waste sector alone, full compliance by 2020 
would create an additional 400 000 jobs (EC, 2017a).  
 
 Research problem, focus and question 
This thesis aims to explain the cross-national differences with regards to non- 
compliance with EU environmental law, that is, why some member states are violating 
EU environmental law more frequently than others. This poses and interesting puzzle 
since one would assume that the member states should be inclined to implement EU 
environmental law, given high ambition within this policy field, the severity and cross-
national nature of the issues and the high costs that follow from non-compliance. So 
how could one go about explaining this?  
I should mention that explaining different degrees of compliance requires different 
approaches depending on what level it aims to be explained at. There are many possible 
reasons behind non-compliance with one specific measure. Explaining a member 
state’s compliance with one single regulation, directive or decision could include 
factors such as the content of the actual measure, the specificities of the situation, the 
people that were involved in the process et cetera. However, there is already a 
considerable amount of studies focusing on specific member states’ implementation 
of certain environmental legal measures (for a thorough literature review, see section 
3.1). There are fewer systematic comparative studies carried out on the macro-level of 
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compliance, where focus is on the different patterns and differences of how member 
states comply with EU environmental law, especially after the Treaty of Lisbon entered 
into force (for an elaboration on contribution to science, see section 3.1). Hence, the 
focus of this thesis is on the macro-level of compliance.  
More concretely, member states’ characteristics and traits will be analyzed as 
determinant of compliance in a broader context, meaning I will investigate all member 
states over four years (2012 – 2016), and not one single member state’s implementation 
of one or a couple of legislative act. Consequently, two restrictions need to be made: 
due to the broad focus of this study and the many cases included, I will not incorporate 
data on member states’ compliance strategies or interest. Instead, I will compare some 
of the general institutional factors of each member state and analyze the association 
between the preconditions of effective compliance, and the actual success of 
compliance (cf. Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998: 237). Thus, this study will contribute to 
the understanding of what kind of context that promotes compliance with EU 
environmental law. This in turn is a first step towards closing the ‘implementation gap’.  
With this broad macro-approach in mind, the research question has been phrased 
as: 
 
 
- Why did the degree of non-compliance with EU environmental law differ between 
member states in the period 2012 to 2016? 
 
 Disposition 
Chapter two includes the background information of this thesis which is needed to 
contextualize the EU environmental policy and the compliance mechanisms. This is 
followed by chapter three which includes the theoretical framework and the 
independent variables that have been singled out in order to explain the cross-national 
differences. Chapter four contains the methodological framework, that is, how the 
study has been conducted and which research design is used. It also comprises 
methodological clarifications and a discussion about how the independent variables 
have been operationalized, and why these specific indicators have been selected. 
Chapter five presents the empirical data and the analysis of these. Lastly, chapter six 
presents the main findings and proposals for further research. 
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2 The EU and environmental law 
To contextualize what is being researched, a short exposé of the development of EU 
environmental policy is given in order to highlight the complexities within this specific 
policy area. Second, a brief presentation is provided of EU environmental law and its 
application. By taking into account the development and application of EU 
environmental law, it is possible to see what is being ‘uploaded’ to and ‘downloaded’ 
from the EU in terms of legislation and policy, and what the ‘downloading’ entails in 
practice (for terminology, see Börzel, 2000: 159). This is followed by a section on the 
state of play in terms of compliance with EU environmental law, and the significant 
cross-national differences that exist within this policy area. 
 European Union Environmental policy: Origins and 
development 
The evolution of environmental policy in the EU can be characterized by steady 
deepening in institutional terms, as well as expansion in substantive responsibilities 
(Lenschow, 2015: 320). One could roughly distinguish two phases in order to point to 
some of the characteristic and political features of this evolution, namely pre and post 
the Single European Act (SEA). 
2.1.1 Pre Single European Act 
In the late 1950s, the first environmental common market directives were passed, 
which focused on rules and safety standards on radiation and control of dangerous 
chemicals (Dragneva, 2011: 71). Although a need for a separate area of EU 
competence within the environmental area was acknowledged, environmental policy 
during this period followed primarily trade-related motivations and was legally based 
on single-market provisions in the Treaties. Common environmental standards for 
products, and the regulation of production processes in order to protect the 
environment or ensure the safe treatment of hazardous waste, were decided to level 
the playing field for economic actors and to remove non-tariff barriers to trade, 
emerging from different regulatory practices in the member states (Lenschow, 2015: 
321). 
In the 1970s, as environmental issues became more salient in Europe, pioneering 
states began pushing for a growing range of measures at a high level of environmental 
protection. These states, with a strong support from the Commission, began 
establishing a European environmental policy at the Community level, making linkages 
to the single market project, and pointing to the trans-border effects of environmental 
pollution (Lenschow, 2015: 321). For the first time, the newly established policy stated 
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that economic expansion was not an intrinsic goal, and a forerunner to the DG 
Environment was formed within the Commission (Dragneva, 2011: 75). The 
Commission and the pioneering member states enjoyed a growing support from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which in a number of rulings offered 
support in favor of environmental protection (Jans & Vedder, 2012: 6). Despite the 
need for unanimity in the Council, the laggard states agreed to common European 
standards in order to secure market access, but also to maintain legitimacy in the 
“greening” international discourse (Lenschow, 2015: 321). 
2.1.2 Post Single European Act  
The ratification of the SEA marked the second phase of the development of EU’s 
environmental policy, by ending its previous informal status. For the first time, the 
objectives of the environment policy were enshrined in the Treaties. The SEA 
introduced a new title on environmental protection, featuring several new articles 
which stipulated the objectives, principles and the decision-making procedure to be 
applied in adopting environmental legislation (Dragneva, 2011: 75). More specifically, 
the SEA provided an explicit legal basis for environmental regulation, introduced 
qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council for some areas of environmental 
policy, and increased the role of the European Parliament (Parliament) in the decision-
making (Lenschow, 2015: 321). The introduction of QMV entailed that member states 
could no longer rely on their veto power to block environmental legislative proposals 
(Dragneva, 2011: 75). This was heavily criticized by the southern member states, 
claiming that European policies had shown no concern for the problems of the 
economically less developed regions. However, these states’ approval was acquired by 
the establishment of a cohesion fund set up in order to finance implementation of EU 
environmental law (Börzel, 2003: 48). The SEA did not only provide the legal basis for 
EU environmental policy, it also highlighted the need to integrate environmental 
objectives into other policy areas in order for the EU to be effective under the so-
called ‘integration principle’ (Dragneva, 2011: 75). 
This was further emphasized in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 
signed in 1993, which laid down that environmental protection must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of other Community policies (Dragneva, 2011: 75f). 
Moreover, the Treaty stated that environmental policy was one of the principle EU 
activities, and a reference to sustainable development was included, stating that the EU 
aimed at achieving “harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities” (EP, 2004). Another significant change was the inclusion of environmental 
protection as a formal accession criterion for the candidate countries (EP, 1998).  
Following the measures adopted under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam introduced further amendments to the legal frameworks in regards to 
the environmental sector. First, the co-decision procedure (ordinary legislative 
procedure) was applied on most of the issues concerning environment, meaning that 
the Parliament received an even more enhanced role. Second, “a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life” was included as EU objectives (Jans & Vedder, 
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2012: 9). A third improvement was that the integration principle was promoted to a 
“general principle of EC law” (Ibid: 9). In contrast to the treaty changes described 
above, the Treaty of Nice did not result in any significant revisions of the 
environmental field. 
In the same vein as the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty of Lisbon did not bring any 
major changes to EU environmental policy. However, it introduced general changes 
in regards to institutional power and decision-making procedures which have had an 
implicit impact on the EU environmental protection. The Treaty of Lisbon has re-
allocated some powers from the member states to the EU, and it defines in a clearer 
way the responsibilities of the EU and the member states, qualifying the environmental 
policy as a sphere of shared competence (Benson & Jordan, 2010: 470). The Treaty of 
Lisbon also further extends decision-making powers to the Parliament, since the 
ordinary legislative procedure is expanded to even more policy areas that have impact 
on the environment (ibid: 472).  
The EU environmental legislation has historically been, and still is, highly dynamic, 
leaving room for different interpretations and it is very dependent on the preferences 
of EU actors. This has resulted in several disputes between the Commission, which 
has tried to push environmental proposals forward, and the member states which have 
been more cautious. This in turn has led to a number of referrals to the CJEU 
(Dragneva, 2011: 75).   
There have not only been disagreements between the institutions, but also within 
the Council. European environmental policy-making has been characterized by a 
“leader-laggard” dynamic, where the leaders in northern Europe have pushed the 
Community process forward, drawing the laggards up to their level of environmental 
protection. The highly industrialized member states in the North have developed strict, 
highly differentiated legal regulations, accompanied by sophisticated state 
implementation arrangements. By doing so, they have managed to obtain favorable 
competition conditions for their domestic industry and avoided environmental 
dumping in low-regulating member states (Börzel, 2003: 44).  
This short historical exposé of EU environmental law and policy provides an 
insight of the complexity of the policy-making procedure within the environmental 
area, and the member states’ different policy preferences. Moreover, it highlights the 
dynamics of the EU environmental agenda, which has experienced a rapid 
development since the 1970s, to become one of the EU’s key competences, 
compromising approximately 500 legislative items (Dragneva, 2011: 78).  
 EU environmental law and its application 
The member states are legally obligated to apply EU law and to take the appropriate 
measures to “ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union” (Article 4.3 TEU, 2007). Hence, EU 
law supersedes national regulations and entrenched practices (Börzel & Buzogany, 
2017).  
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Primarily, EU environmental law is contained in the Treaties. They are the primary 
sources of environmental principles and lay down the basic provisions for the decision-
making and the implementation of environmental measures, meaning that they 
provide for minimal legal harmonization on environmental matters (Dragneva, 2011: 
80). 
Article 288 TFEU (2007) specifies the legal instrument constituting the source of 
secondary legislations. These binding legal instruments are, in a legal hierarchical order; 
regulations, directives and decisions (Chalmers et al, 2014: 111).  
Regulations are the most centralizing of all Union instruments and are used when 
there is a need for uniformity, since they must be applied in its entirely across the EU. 
They automatically form a part of the domestic legal order in each member state on 
the day they enter into force, meaning that there is no need for further transposition, 
except in rare cases (Jans & Vedder, 2012: 124f).  
Within environmental law however, the EU mainly relies on directives (as much as 
95 per cent) with a lesser reliance on the other instruments (Dragneva, 2011: 80). 
Directives are binding as to the results to be achieved, but leave the choice as to form 
and methods used to implement them to the discretion of the member states. For 
directives to enter into effect, they must first be legally implemented in the member 
states. This requires the adoption of new legislative acts, amendment of existing laws 
or the annulment of provisions preventing the accomplishment of a directive’s 
objectives (Tallberg, 2002: 623). Although, like other legislative instruments, a directive 
comes into force 20 days after publication or on the time specified in the directive, it 
will give a deadline, usually 18 or 24 months, by which the member states must 
transpose its obligation into national law (Chalmers et al, 2014: 112). 
In contrast to regulations and directives, decisions are only binding on those to 
whom it is addressed (usually member states, but also private parties) but is also 
binding in its entirety, that is, it must not be applied incompletely, selectively or 
partially (Chalmers et al, 2014: 111ff).  
2.2.1 Monitoring of non-compliance 
Whilst the member states are the ones legally obliged to comply with EU law, the 
Commission has been delegated the responsibility for monitoring ensuring 
compliance1, through its role as the “Guardian of the Treaties” (under Article 17 TEU, 
2007). The most important instrument at the Commission’s disposal is the procedure 
laid down in Article 258 TFEU (2007). This article provides that the Commission may 
bring a matter in front of the CJEU if it considers that a member state has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under the Treaties (Jans & Vedder, 2012: 171). The Commission 
                                                       
 
1 Although this thesis uses the concept of compliance, defined as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s 
behavior and a specified rule”, some of the previous research use the concept of implementation (Trieb, 2014: 5). 
These concepts are related in many ways, but one could argue that compliance has a higher level of abstraction, since 
it has a macro-perspective and focuses less on the process and more on the outcome of implementation. Given that 
this thesis focus on the outcome in terms of rule conformity, I use the concept of compliance which, however, often 
requires implementation (see next page). 
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distinguishes, from a legal perspective, five different kinds of infringement 
proceedings: 
 
1) Violation of Treaty provisions, regulations and decisions 
Provisions, regulations and decisions are directly applicable and do not need to be 
incorporated into national law. Non-compliance takes the form of not, or 
incorrectly applying and enforcing European obligations as well as of taking, or 
not repealing, violative national measures. 
2) Non-transposition of directives (‘no measures notified’) 
Non-compliance manifests itself in a total failure to issue the required legislation. 
3) Incorrect legal implementation of directives (‘not properly incorporated’) 
Non-compliance takes the form of incomplete or incorrect incorporation of 
directives into national law 
4) Improper application of directives (‘not properly applied’) 
Non-compliance involves the active violation of taking conflicting national 
measures, or the failure of invoking the obligations of the directive. The latter also 
involves failure to enforce EU law, that is, taking action against violators.  
5) Non-compliance with CJEU judgements (‘not yet complied with’)  
Non-compliance refers to the failure of member states to execute CJEU 
judgements which establish a breach of EU law.  
     (Börzel, 2003: 9) 
 
To summarize the above - the Commission can initiate infringement proceedings 
against member states in situations where they have not transposed and implemented 
the measures on time or at all, but also where they have implemented it incorrectly. 
The most common type of infringement proceeding within the environmental area is 
the former of these. As the member states are twice reminded by the Commission of 
their obligations, a practice has evolved where the Commission initiates an 
infringement proceeding after expiry of the time limit if a member states has not 
communicated that the necessary measures have been taken (Jans & Vedder, 2012: 
172f). 
To detect the potential violations of EU environmental law, the Commission 
monitors member states’ compliance following a two-track approach. On the one hand 
it collects and assesses information on member states’ compliance record through in-
house monitoring. On the other hand, it relies on informal procedures through which 
it records and examines complaints lodged by citizens, companies and NGOs, and on 
petitions and questions from the Parliament (Tallberg, 2002: 616). During the last 
decade, the latter approach has developed into the main source of detecting 
infringements since it provides access to information otherwise unobtainable (Börzel 
& Knoll, 2012: 10) 
If the Commission suspects a breach of EU law it usually starts by informally 
engaging in a bilateral discussion with the member state concerned. If the discussion 
is not fruitful and the member state still does not comply, the Commission will initiate 
an infringement proceeding. However, that is only considered “when all other means 
have failed” (Börzel, 2003: 14). In total, only about one third of all breaches leads to a 
formal infringement procedure. These procedures have four stages:  
  9 
 
1) Letter of formal notice is a preliminary stage and thus not a part of the formal 
infringement procedure. The formal letter of notice means that the 
Commission invites the member state concerned to submit its observations, 
usually within two months.  
2) Reasoned opinion is the first official step of the infringement proceeding where 
the Commission gives the member state a time limit, typically two months, 
within which it expects the issue to be rectified. 
3) Referral to the CJEU is the last means to which the Commission can resort in 
cases of non-compliance. Usually before the case is referred to the CJEU, the 
Commission tries to bilaterally find a last minute solution. 
4) CJEU judgement is the last step where the Court acts as an adjudicator between 
the Commission and the member state, by investigating if there was a breach 
of EU law. The Commission can also ask the CJEU to impose financial 
sanctions.  
     (Börzel 2003: 10) 
 
 Compliance with environmental law: State of play 
European integration is claimed to be hampered by an implementation deficit (Mbaye, 
2001; Mastenbroek & Van Keulen, 2006: 20; Börzel et al, 2007). From the 1980s 
onwards, scholars and EU officials have shared the view that member states’ 
compliance records are rather poor. Some scholars even argue that non-compliance 
constitute one of the most pressing problems for the Commission in its efforts to 
manage the European integration process and that “the inconsistent observance of law 
by the member states has stood squarely in the way of unification” (Duina, 1997 in 
Mastenbroek & Van Keulen, 2006: 21). The deficit first came about during the process 
of establishing the internal market in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In order to develop 
the single European market, an ambitious legislative program was adopted, 
compromising approximately 300 measures, mostly in the form of directives. Although 
the progress on the legislative stage arguably was impressive, the project seemed to 
slow down at the desks of national bureaucrats and politicians. Member states’ 
implementation of the directives turned out to be far from impressive. In 1991, one 
year from the agreed starting date, member states had only transposed 65 per cent of 
all directives. In the 1990s, the Commission was initiating over 1000 proceedings 
annually, and in 1997 that figure exceeded 1400 (Tallberg, 2002: 625). Since then, 
however, the Commission has increased its efforts in order to try to close the 
compliance gap. It started off rather cautiously by establishing working groups 
focusing on the issue. Yet, over time, the Commission has toughened its stance 
considerably with the help of the CJEU as a fervent enforcer of EU law (Mastenbroek 
& Van Keulen, 2006:21). However, with the increasing amount of legislative acts at 
the European level, non-compliance remains today a serious threat to the effectiveness 
of EU law, with over 1650 infringement proceedings still remaining open in the end 
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of 2016, which according to the Commission is “not yet good enough” (EC, 2017c; 
EC, 2017f).  
This brings us to the state of play of compliance within the environmental area and 
the derivation of the dependent variable – the number of initiated infringement 
proceedings due to member states’ non-compliance with EU environmental law 
between 2012 to 2016 (for a methodological discussion, see section 4.1). As mentioned 
in the introduction, environmental directives are one of the most violated EU 
measures. Approximately 23,7 per cent of the infringement proceedings registered by 
the Commission fall within the environmental area, despite the fact that as little as 
seven per cent of the total amount of directives are devoted to this policy area (EC, 
2017d:10). One can thus observe that it is a policy area characterized by a 
comparatively low number of directives, but with many infringement proceedings. In 
total, the Commission initiated 1485 infringements against member states for 
breaching EU environmental law between 2012 - 2016. The high number of 
infringement proceedings within the environmental area reflects the width of the 
compliance gap, especially considering that as little as one third of all breaches actually 
results in a formal infringement proceeding (Börzel, 2003: 10). The data is collected 
from the Commission’s infringement decision database, which contains information 
about the legal action the Commission has brought against the member states (EC, 
2017e). All cases in which the Commission has sent a reasoned opinion and thus 
started an official infringement proceeding have been included, no matter if it is 
because of a violation, non-transposition, incorrect implementation or improper 
application. Moreover, the data does not differentiate between breaches of regulations, 
directives or decisions.  
I have created a bar chart below, presenting the avarage number of initiated 
infringement proceedings per year within the environmental area between 2012 -2016. 
As can be seen from the chart, compliance with EU environmental law is not 
uniformly poor across all member states. No member state has a taintless track record 
given that all have infringed EU law at least a couple of times, but the picture is patchy 
with substaintial cross-national differences. For example, Lithuania has on avarage 
only infringed EU environmental law two times per year, whilst the worst laggard state 
Greece has infringed EU environmental law 25,6 times – 13 times more.  The same 
goes for Spain, which has infringed EU environmental law 11 times more than the 
second best complier, the Netherlands. The member states have on avarage breached 
EU environmental law 10, 5 times2 per year from 2012 to 2016. 
 
 
                                                       
 
2 Five per cent trimmed mean 
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Figure 1. Average number of initiated infringement proceedings between 2012 - 2016 
Source: Author's own compilation from EC, 2017e 
 
These findings are broadly in line with earlier studies on compliance with EU 
environmental law among the EU-12 and EU-15, which also have identified a north - 
south divide. Belgium, together with the southern member states Spain, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal have previosuly been found to be the biggest environmental laggards, 
measured by how many infringement proceedings the Commission has initiated 
(Lenschow, 2015: 334ff; Börzel, 2003). However, as can be seen from the chart, 
Portugal and Belgum are no longer among the worst compliers while France is. 
Moreover, Poland – which gained its EU membership in the “big bang” enlargement 
in 2004 – is also among of the worst compliers. The Nordic countries, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have previosuly been identified as the 
environmental leaders among the EU 15 (Börzel, 2003: 33). However, the United 
Kingdom is not longer among the leader, which can be seen from its placement in the 
middle, breaching EU environmental law more than the average 10,5 time per year. 
The Baltic states which gained EU membership in 2004 have taken the lead with 
Estonia, Lativa and Lithuania being among the five best compliers. It is worth noting 
that eight out of the ten best compliers are northern European countries. One could 
thus conclude that the North – South divide is still rather evident, even though the 
performance of France and Poland blurs the picture somewhat. 
To summarize this chapter; environmental issues have become increasingly 
important for the EU and its member states, from the first directives passed in the late 
1950s until today. However, the member states’ degree of compliance does (still) not 
match the importance they claim to attach to environmental issues, which has resulted 
in an implementation gap. Arguably, the gap between the policy output and the 
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implementation reduces the credibility and the impact of the EU’s environmental 
policy on the environment. This makes it an urgent problem for the EU to solve, and 
an interesting puzzle for researchers to disentangle.  
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3 Understanding cross-national 
differences 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework that this thesis is based upon. Since 
the theories are based on earlier research, I start by providing a short presentation of 
the previously conducted studies on compliance with EU environmental law. Also, a 
discussion is provided about what this study adds to the accumulated knowledge on 
compliance with international regimes. Following this, I present three approaches to 
compliance. Lastly, section 3.3 and the following sub-sections present the derivation 
of the four independent variables, based on the enforcement approach and the 
management approach. 
 Earlier research on compliance with EU 
environmental law 
The EU compliance deficit has received significant scholar attention since the 
Commission, in accordance with article 226 EC, began providing the Parliament with 
reports on the number of infringement against member states in 1984 (König & 
Luetgert, 2009: 164). It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a presentation 
of this vast amount of literature. Instead, Trieb (2014) and Angelova et al (2012) can 
be consulted for extensive reviews. The review below will only present the main studies 
conducted within the environmental area.  
Just as within the broader field of compliance with EU law, there are quite a few 
studies conducted on member states’ compliance with EU environmental law. One 
could broadly divide these into small n-studies and large n-studies.  
For instance, in a small-n study Bailey (2002) looked at Germany’s and the United 
Kingdom’s implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive investigated whether 
successful implementation is determined by the compatibility of national and 
European procedures, or domestic institutional veto points. He concludes that even 
though institutional veto points are important during transposition, national resistance 
is often prompted by poor policy fit. Further, Nimmo Smith et al (2007) have 
researched why Denmark was more successful than the United Kingdom in 
implementing the Nitrate Directive and found that it was because of the vagueness of 
the Directive itself, which resulted into different interpretations (see also Buckley 
2012). In a more recent study, Bourblanc et al (2012) have researched differences in 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive in Denmark, France, 
England/Wales and the Netherlands. They conclude, inter alia, that the visibility of the 
policy process; accountability of politicians and policy-makers vis-à-vis their 
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constituents and the EU; divisions of responsibilities for implementation; and the 
involvement of the public, can to a certain extent explain the level of ambition in EU 
implementation. 
Other scholars have researched certain member states over a number of years. For 
instance, Christoph Knill and Andrea Lenschow (1998) have conducted a study on the 
United Kingdom’s and Germany’s implementation of four environmental directives, 
and found that the extent to which administrative traditions affect implementation 
effectiveness is less dependent on the “real” cost of adaptation than on the level of 
embeddedness of existing structures. In other words, administrations refuse to comply 
when EU rules are contradicting core elements or administrative arrangements.  In a 
similar vein, Tanja Börzel (2000) has, by comparing Germany’s and Spain’s legal 
implementation of five environmental policies, found that implementation failure is 
not a southern problem, and there is no such thing as a “Mediterranean Syndrome”. 
She argues that the southern member states do not constitute a homogenous group, 
and thus she challenges the notion that these states would be inherently bad at 
complying with EU environmental law. Instead, Börzel argues that their high degree 
of non-compliance stems from significant policy misfit, capacity at the decision-
making level, socio-economic development and the absence of domestic mobilization 
in favor of implementation, all which may change over time. Hence, the southern 
member states are not doomed to be laggards. In a similar fashion, Peter Bursens 
(2002) has conducted a comparative study between Denmark and Belgium in order to 
find out why the former has a better compliance record compared to the latter in 
regards to EU environmental directives between 1997 - 2000. The study finds that the 
difference could be explained by the national institutional contexts, where Denmark 
as a centralized country with a competent state bureaucracy has more favorable 
implementation conditions compared to the federal state of Belgium.  
Over the years, an increasing number of scholars have enhanced our knowledge 
about compliance through quantitative studies, even though they still are quite rare 
within the environmental area. Borghetto and Franchino (2009) have found, by 
collecting information about over 700 directives in nine member states between 1978 
and 2004, that sub-national involvement tends to prolong the process of transposition 
of EU environmental law. Moreover, Spendzharova and Versluis’ (2013) study on 
member states’ transposition of 143 environmental directives between 1996 - 2008 
demonstrates that member states and governments attaching high salience to 
environmental protection, and governments comprising Green parties, tend to 
transpose environmental directives faster than those which do not. In another study, 
Zhelyazkova et al (2017) have compared the old and the new EU member states’ 
compliance records in regards to internal market, Justice and Home Affairs, 
environment and social policy directives, and found that the new member states were 
generally more efficient in transposing EU law than the old member states, despite low 
levels of administrative capacity. This is explained by the pre-accession conditionality, 
meaning that the new member states have gained particular skills by transposing vast 
amounts of EU law into national legislation. In one of the more recent studies, Börzel 
and Buzogany (2017) have found that the environmental implementation gap has in 
fact narrowed over the last years. Except for the southern enlargement, taking on new 
member states has not widened the compliance problems with regards to 
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environmental law. This is explained by the Commission’s new compliance strategy 
and the development of new instrument strengthening member states’ capacities in 
implementing EU legislation.  
To summarize the above, scholars have used different research designs, relying on 
different data sets, testing different variables and hypothesis, aimed at explaining 
different assumptions. In general, the small–n studies have pointed to the degree of 
misfit between European rules and existing regulatory traditions, while the quantitative 
studies have analyzed what institutional and state characteristics that are most 
conducive to compliance. Theoretical insights from the literature on compliance with 
international regimes and Europeanization have all been applied to the study of 
compliance with EU environmental law. The attention of these theories roughly 
converge on the impact of preferences, as emphasized by the enforcement approach, 
and institutional capacity for change, as stressed by the management approach. 
Acknowledging the results of the earlier research, this thesis will also focus on these 
two approaches, something which is elaborated further upon in section 3.2. 
Even though this study builds on the accumulated knowledge gained on 
compliance so far, it differs from the earlier research in several ways. Firstly, in contrast 
to these earlier studies, which mainly have relied on selective research designs 
comparing implementation of a few, specific directives in a couple or more member 
states, this thesis will have a broader focus by studying the EU-27s’ compliance with 
several EU measures over a longer time period. A big majority of the earlier studies 
were conducted in, or focus on the 1990s and early 2000s, which is why they only 
include the EU-12 or EU-15. No earlier studies, with the exception of Zhelyazkova et 
al (2017), focus on the EU-28. Hence, by taking a step back and including all the 
member states, this thesis will incorporate countries that have not yet been studied in 
the context of compliance, thus adding to the accumulated knowledge within this 
research area (for a discussion on case selection, see sub-section 4.2.2). 
Secondly, this thesis will cover an under-researched time period. The time period 
is particularly interesting because no other research within this field has focused on the 
post-Lisbon era, which – as described in section 2.1.2 – brought some institutional 
changes with bearing on environmental policy. Since it covers the post-Lisbon era up 
until 2016, it aims to reach conclusions on the current state of play with regards to 
compliance with EU environmental law. 
Thirdly, this piece will combine and apply theoretical findings from other EU 
policy fields to the specific policy field of environment, thus adding to the theoretical 
understanding of compliance with EU environmental law. 
To summarize - by focusing on the under-researched time period between 2012 
and 2016, with new member states, incorporating theoretical findings from other 
policy fields, this thesis will provide additional insights to answer the ongoing 
controversy between scholars, who disagree on the causes of non-compliance.  
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 Three Compliance Approaches 
After having presented the earlier research, this section will address the insights gained 
so far about the political, economic and administrative parameters influencing 
compliance with EU environmental law. As argued in section 3.1, much of the 
previous research has tried to identify the state characteristics that are most conducive 
to making compliance possible. The dominating approaches in this debate are 
commonly referred to as the enforcement approach, emphasizing member states’ 
willingness to comply and the management approach, stressing member states capacity to 
comply (Tallberg, 2002: 611). At a more general level, the discussion on the influence 
of willingness versus capacity connects to the discussion on whether compliance with 
EU law should be perceived as a political or administrative process. A political vision 
of the process emphasizes the importance of preferences, while if compliance is merely 
seen as an administrative exercise, there is little room for political preferences 
(Toshkov, 2007). 
The following discussion about what factors influence member states’ compliance 
with EU law starts with a reasoning on why EU level explanations are not relevant to 
this study. Following that, I present the two broad theoretical approaches used in this 
thesis.  
3.2.1 EU-level based explanations 
 
Several features that stem from the European level are thought to contribute to the 
rather high degree of compliance failure within the environmental area (Tallberg, 2002: 
613). These features could broadly be divided into governance-related and content-
related factors. The former mainly points to the role of the Commission as the 
“Guardian of the Treaties” and includes shortcomings such as bad communication 
and responsiveness (ibid.). The latter points to ambiguity and inconsistency of 
directives, and the high degree of technicality of these (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998; 
Bursens, 2002: 180).  
Both the governance and content- related factors are arguably important, and since 
they should affect all member states equally they are likely to be effective in explaining 
the member states’ overall bad compliance record within the environmental area (cf. 
Bursens, 2002: 180). However, given that the member states are not equally affected 
by poor compliance, and that this thesis aims at explaining these cross-national 
differences, the European level factors will not be further elaborated upon. 
3.2.2 Enforcement approach 
The enforcement approach originally stems from the rationalist theory school which 
posits that states are rational actors that weigh the costs and benefits of alternative 
behavioral choices when making compliance decisions in cooperative situations 
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(Tallberg 2002: 611). The general assumption is that the member states with stronger 
incentives to deviate from a particular EU legislative instrument will take longer time 
to transpose it and are thus less likely to comply (Argomaniz, 2010: 307). States may 
not value the actual contents of the legislation, even though they consider the act of 
participation and signing as important, especially in an organization such as the EU 
where the member states value the existing consensus culture (Tallberg 2002: 612). 
Thus, even though a government thinks that the signing of an agreement is in its 
interest, the calculations on whether to actually comply are different – that decision 
may be a matter of priorities given that compliance usually comes with adaptation 
costs, requiring resources that could have been put to alternative use.  
3.2.3 Management approach 
In contrast to the enforcement approach, the management approach focuses instead 
on the administrative and institutional traits of the member states. This approach 
posits that over many legislative acts, the capacity and quality of member states’ 
administrations affect the speed and quality of implementation. Hence, non-
compliance or slow implementation is considered involuntary, caused by for example 
lack of resources and knowledge, rather than an active and conscious decision. Some 
member states’ administrative structures could thus be said to be more adequate to 
transpose legislation than others (Argomaniz, 2010: 309; Tallberg, 2002: 613). Political 
capacity limitations arise when a government does not have the ability to ensure that 
public and private actors meet international commitments. The central government 
may for instance be unable to secure ratification, command compliance from their sub-
national authorities, or pool the necessary administrative capacity to comply (Tallberg, 
2002. 613). In contrast, economic capacity problems arise when financial constraints 
affect a member state’s ability to fulfil its international commitments (ibid.). Hence, 
macro-economic factors are indirectly important, since they set the economic and 
political framework within which actors operate (ibid.).  
Consequently, economic and political capacity problems are expected to have a 
negative effect on member states compliance capacity.  
 Deriving independent variables 
The broad theoretical approaches and explanations provided above interlink further 
in the following sections. Since the general theoretical idea is that willingness 
(enforcement approach), as well as the practical dimension of capacity (management 
approach) play a role in compliance, I have singled out explanatory variables to belong 
to one or the other of these. In total, four independent variables based on the two 
distinct approaches have been created, reflecting the assumed necessary condition for 
efficient transposition and compliance of EU environmental law. The variables I have 
selected in line with the enforcement approach are issue salience and political power. 
The management approach does not however use the concept of state capacity 
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uniformly in the literature. Resource-centered scholars define capacity as a state’s 
ability to act, whilst neo-institutionalist scholars argue that the domestic institutional 
set-up influences the degree to which a state can act and its autonomy to make 
decisions (Börzel et al, 2007: 8). To do these two lines of argument justice, I 
differentiate between the autonomy of member state governments and administrative 
efficiency, both of which belong to the management approach. 
Clearly, other variables than the ones presented in the following section, based on 
the approaches presented in sub-section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 could have been included in 
this thesis. However, time and space constraints limit the variables that can feasibly be 
included in any one project, which is the case also for this study (Landman, 2008: 24). 
Instead, this thesis aims at explaining the bigger picture and the explanatory weight of 
the selected variables. Hence, it is acknowledged already at this stage that this study 
alone cannot fully explain everything in the macro-field of compliance within the 
environmental area – it rather adds one more piece to the highly complicated puzzle.  
The selected variables were identified as the most suitable for the following 
reasons. First and foremost, these variables are not taken form a vacuum – all of them 
are based on academic literature or previous research on legal compliance with 
international regimes and thus have been proven useful. Issue salience and 
administrative capacity have been tested previously in relation to member states’ 
compliance with EU environmental law, (cf. Spendzharova & Versluis, 2013), whilst 
the other selected variables have been tested on legal compliance in other policy fields, 
with other member states and during different time periods (cf. Mbaye, 2001, Börzel 
et al, 2007).  
Secondly, since the number of cases – EU-27 – is rather small for a statistical study, 
including additional variables could risk leading to “too many inferences and not 
enough observations”, which in turn could lead to faulty assumptions (Landman, 2008: 
30). Hence, including too many irrelevant variables would risk making the research 
design indeterminate (King et al, 1994: 178).  
Lastly, the number of cases and the selected time period already provide for a 
substantial workload, which is why certain pragmatism needs to be practiced. This in 
turn admittedly leads to a risk of omitted variable bias, meaning that some important 
factors could be left out (King, et al, 1994). However, by practicing intersubjectivity 
and transparency in the selection and operationalization of the variables, and 
comparing the results with findings of previous research, the risk of omitted variable 
bias is mitigated (elaborated further upon in section 4.3). 
3.3.1 Impact of issue salience 
Since policy-makers operate with limited available time and capacities, they cannot 
focus on all policy items on the political agenda. Instead, they need to focus on a 
smaller sub-set of issues that have most attracted their attention. It is this relative 
importance of an issue that is assumed to influence policy-makers’ prioritization and 
actions (Spendzharova & Verseluis, 2013: 1499). Hence, salience influences how much 
attention decision-makers devote to certain issues, or in other words the “cognitive 
shortcuts of human actors to select which information they process before deciding 
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on a course of action” (Ibid: 1503).  
Since policy-makers are expected to consider public opinion, I will test whether 
the relative salience of environmental issues among the public affects a member state’s 
compliance record. The underlying assumption is that when the general public cares 
about an issue and indicates that it should be considered as a top priority, there is more 
pressure on the government to act, meaning that it calls for efforts at the EU level to 
agree and deliver on legislation, and on the national level to comply with that legislation 
(Spendzharova & Versluis, 2013: 1504). That holds especially true for the specific 
policy field of environment, which is more controversial and frequently receives more 
public attention than for instance agricultural policy, thus raising the costs for non-
compliance (Angelova et al, 2012: 1283). It is therefore assumed that compliance is 
more likely in member states where environmental issues are salient, since politicians 
tend to make decisions that promote their re-election. 
Spendzharova & Versluis’ (2013) study on how issue salience affected member 
states’ transposition of 143 directives adopted between 1996-2008 shows that this 
variable has some explanatory weight, even though the effect is rather small. In 
contrast to this, there are scholars that argue that the more salient an issue is, the slower 
the transposition, due to the likeliness of domestic conflict (Börzel & Knoll 2014: 13). 
Hence, this thesis endorses Angelova and colleagues’ call to further expose this 
variable to empirical testing (Angelova et al, 2012). The hypothesis is phrased as: 
 
H1: The more salient environmental issues are in a member state, the less likely it is to breach 
EU environmental law. 
 
Spendzharova & Versluis (2013) also investigate how salient environmental issues are 
for the selected governments by studying their respective party manifestos. This 
explanation has also proven to be fruitful, but due to the limited scope of this thesis 
such a labor-intensive investigation is unfortunately not possible. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that public opinion and governments’ priorities correlate to a 
certain degree, because governments whose electorates care about the environment 
are likely to dedicate sufficient room for this issue in their party manifestos, since they 
care about re-election.  
3.3.2 Impact of EU- specific political power 
Following the argument of Keohane and Nye on power, states can be regarded as 
more sensitive to the costs imposed by sanctions if they have less political power 
compared to other states, the latter being more resistant to external pressure (Keohane 
& Nye, 1977). If one considers the dependent variable, one would thus expect that the 
less politically powerful a member state is, the more sensitive it is to external pressures 
from the Commission and other member states, and the less likely it is to cause an 
infringement proceeding. Contrariwise, the more politically powerful member states 
would be more resistant to external pressure, which is why one could assume that these 
states breach EU environmental law more often. According to this line of 
argumentation, the political weight translates into indifference or even resistance vis-
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à-vis “external” rules imposed on states. This mechanism of obstinacy thereby predicts 
a positive relationship between the power of a member state and the number of 
infringements (Börzel et al, 2007: 5). 
Another variant of the enforcement approach also focuses on the political power 
of the member states, but puts more emphasis on the decision-making process. 
According to this line of reasoning, the member states’ political power affects their 
compliance record through the decision-making process. The underlying rationale is 
that the political weight is closely related to a state’s ability to shape legislation 
according to its preferences at the EU decision-making level. Smaller, and politically 
weaker states cannot ignore the more powerful ones during the decision-making in the 
Council. One would thus assume that the outcome of the decision-making process lies 
closer to the preferences of the more politically powerful member states than the 
weaker ones (Börzel et al, 2007: 6). Since EU directives must be implemented by all 
member states, those member states that have been able to sell their argument in the 
legislative-making process will be able to transpose and comply with the legislative acts 
with less effort than those who have not, since the adoption costs are comparatively 
lower. Hence, politically more powerful member states are assumed to comply to a 
higher degree than the weaker ones.  
Since the two described lines of reasoning contradicts each other, it is important 
to expose them to further empirical testing. However, while it is hypothesized that 
EU-specific political power influences a member states’ compliance record, the 
direction of the effect must be left unspecified. Hence, the second hypothesis is 
phrased as: 
 
H2: A member state’s EU specific political power affects its compliance record. 
3.3.3 Impact of government autonomy3 
The involvement of sub-national authorities, meaning the regional and local 
governments within national states, in decision-making and implementation poses 
both an opportunity and a risk for the EU. Broader participation is in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity and it is believed to narrow the EU’s alleged legitimacy 
problems. However, the involvement of sub-national authorities has its price too. First, 
their involvement in the consultation and implementation phase multiplies the number 
of conflicting perspectives that have to be aggregated, thus increasing the number of 
potential veto players which in turn increases the risk for late implementation 
(Borghetto & Franchino, 2010:2; Tsebelis, 2002). Second, the literature on US public 
policy shows that sub-national policy-makers tend to skew policies to the extent that 
the outcomes do not match national outcomes. This twisting of policies at the sub-
national level can have the effect of causing infringements at the national level (Mbaye, 
2001: 264). Hence, it is theorized that hierarchical states in which greater authority is 
vested in the central government will have an easier time transposing international 
                                                       
 
3 In the compliance literature, government autonomy is also referred to as centralization, multi-level 
governance, and in some cases institutional veto points. 
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regimes into national law than decentralized systems in which the central government 
has little control over the sub-national authorities (Mbaye, 2001: 264).  
In essence, the involvement of sub-national authorities thus represents another 
point in the policy cycle where delays or failures could occur, which in theory would 
add to the already existing implementation gap. This is especially relevant within the 
environmental area, where the involvement of the sub-national authorities is higher 
compared to other policy areas, which is probably due to the strong territorial nature 
of this sector (Borghetto & Franchino, 2010: 10; Mbaye, 2001: 264). Accordingly, 
timely and accurate transposition is assumed to be more likely in states with higher 
degrees of government authority, where the central government has both power and 
responsibility within its borders, compared to states with lower degree of government 
autonomy (Haverland & Romeijn, 2007: 773).  
This variable has been tested in previous research (cf Mbaye, 2001; Borghetto & 
Franchino, 2010) but as Steunenberg and Rhinard concludes, it has not held up well 
under empirical testing “and thus requires further elaboration” (2010: 498). The 
hypothesis is phrased as: 
 
H3: The higher the degree of government autonomy of a member state, the less likely it is to 
breach EU environmental law. 
 
3.3.4 Impact of administrative efficiency 
 
As mentioned earlier, the management approach stipulates that non-compliance is 
involuntary and not the result of an active decision. Legislative actors are forced to rely 
on already established bureaucratic institutions that may lack the sufficient resources, 
capacity or knowledge to implement legislation. Hence, even though a legislative 
proposal gets support at the political level, effective implementation is dependent on 
the effective functioning of domestic institutions (Zhelyazkova et al, 2017: 831). Some 
of the member states have been found to lack the efficient administrative machinery 
to transpose EU law, even though they have the political will to do so (Argomaniz, 
2010).  
Administrative efficiency as a variable has been tested in many other policy areas, 
and it has registered a significant effect (cf. Mbaye 2001; Toshkov 2007). However, in 
a recent study conducted by Zhelyazkova and colleagues (2017), they find that the 
central eastern European countries (CEEC) that gained EU membership in 2004 and 
2007 in general do not perform worse in terms of transposition of EU directives 
compared to the other states, despite a less efficient state bureaucracy. Consequently, 
this variable requires further empirical testing. 
 
H4: The more efficient the bureaucracy of a member state is, the less likely it is to breach EU 
law. 
 
 
  22 
To sum up this chapter: four independent variables in total have been singled out from 
the theoretical framework. Two are in line with the enforcement approach and two 
which are based on the management approach. These four variables are assumed to 
affect the number of infringement proceedings.  
 
 
Figure 2. Factors assumed to affect successful compliance with EU environmental law 
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4 Measuring state characteristics 
This chapter begins with a methodological clarification regarding the issues arising 
from of using infringement proceedings as an indicator for non-compliance. Further, 
a discussion is held about the time period in focus of this study. Following that, in 
section 4.2, I present and explain the choices made with regards to the research design 
and case selection. This is followed by a section where I describe how the 
operationalization is carried out, and discuss how and why the indicators have been 
defined and structured the way they have. 
 Methodological clarifications 
All studies on compliance face the methodological challenge of measuring non-
compliance. Some scholars have developed their own assessment and collected their 
own data in case studies, whereas others have drawn on statistical data provided by the 
monitoring bodies of international organizations. In contrast to these studies, I have 
“outsourced” the identification of violations of EU law by relying on statistics on 
initiated infringement proceedings as an indirect indicator for compliance with EU 
law. This is admittedly not without methodological problems. As Börzel and 
colleagues, rather bluntly, state: “[…] there are good reasons to question whether 
infringement proceedings qualify as a valid and reliable indicator for compliance failure 
and constitute a representative sample of all the violations that occur” (Börzel et al, 
2007: 3). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Commission has limited 
resources which is why it is not capable of detecting and pursuing all breaches of EU 
law. Since infringement proceedings refer to cases that are both detected by the 
Commission and where it decides to act, one cannot know for sure in how many cases 
it does not react when a member state is not complying. Hence, one could argue that 
the infringement proceedings only represent a fraction of all breaches, and that those 
only constitute the “tip of the non-compliance iceberg” (Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009: 
292). Second, in theory the initiated infringement cases could be a result of conscious 
strategy from the Commission, meaning that it might treat the usual laggards more 
strictly, and policy priorities may guide its enforcement policy (ibid).  
These deficiencies are acknowledged, but all researchers that are interested in 
studying compliance face similar problems of measurement, and all approaches have 
their pros and cons. However, there are also strong arguments in favor of using 
infringement proceedings to measure non-compliance. For instance, there are no 
indications that the Commission’s limited capacity to detect non-compliance 
systematically biases data towards specific member states (Börzel et al, 2010: 1373). If 
the Commission in its roles as “the Guardian of the Treaties” was systematically biased 
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in its selection of infringement cases, it would not only undermine its self-perception, 
but also its legitimacy and mandate. The Commission is assumed to be aware that its 
authority is highly dependent on its credibility as an impartial adjudicator between 
competing interests, which is why it needs to avoid giving the impression that it treats 
member states differently (Börzel & Knoll, 2012: 8). Moreover, as described in sub-
section 2.2.1 there are strong safeguards in place against a prosecution bias, meaning 
that the detection of non-compliance does not only rely on the Commission’s in-house 
assessment but also on reports from the member states, complaints from citizens, 
companies, NGOs, petitions from the Parliament et cetera. To sum up the above – 
overall there are no indications that the infringement data contains a bias towards 
specific member states. While it is not possible to know how big the non-compliance 
iceberg actually is, the infringement data provides means to explore why some member 
states comply worse than others. A clear strength of using infringement proceedings 
as a measurement for non-compliance is that I for sure know that there has been a 
breach of EU law, since the infringement proceeding is the last step in a long chain of 
notifications form the Commission. Further, by using infringement proceedings, I can 
test the independent variables over a relatively large number of cases, thus enabling 
generalizations and enhancing the external validity of the study. 
Another methodological point needing clarification is the time period in focus of 
this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is not to explain variation in compliance over 
time, but rather why some member states breach EU environmental law to a higher 
degree than others. To answer the question, the focus of this thesis is on the years 
2012 to 2016. Although this is a relatively short time period, it is long enough to pick 
up on several infringement proceedings that provide us with a clear and representative 
picture of which states are doing well and those doing comparatively worse in terms 
of compliance. However, it is acknowledged that this only represents a snapshot in 
time.  
 Methodological point of departure 
4.2.1 Research design 
A comparative research design is found most suitable to answer the research question. 
A comparison of the member states allows the hypothesis derived from the theoretical 
framework to be tested through examining cross-national differences and similarities. 
This mode of analysis is often seen as the reason d’ être for new comparative politics, 
and it is believed to contribute to the progressive accumulation of knowledge about 
the political world (Landman, 2008: 7ff).  
When conducting comparative studies, scholars face the decision of choosing 
between using quantitative or qualitative methods. In essence, quantitative research 
uses statistical methods, it abstracts from particular instances to seek general 
descriptions or to test causal hypothesis, and it seeks measurement that are easily 
replicable by other scholars. Qualitative research on the other hand covers a wide range 
of approaches, but they usually focus on a small number of cases and none of these 
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approaches relies on numbers (King et al, 1994: 2f). Quantitative and qualitative 
research are usually depicted as dichotomous. For the sake of clarity, it should be stated 
early on that this study falls into the former of these methods. However, it may be 
worth recalling that this division is a false one since both methods “adhere to the goal 
of making inferences from available evidence” (Landman, 2008:21), and that all 
research can be understood to derive from the same underlying logic of inference 
(King et al, 1994).   
To explain cross-national differences with regards to non-compliance on a macro-
level, a statistical method is deemed most appropriate. The main underlying 
assumption of statistical analysis in general is that events and facts in the world exhibit 
certain distributions, which can be described, compared and analyzed. The comparison 
of the distributions is carried out to see if a relationship exists between them for the 
sample. Comparing many countries on the basis of their internal traits moves one step 
beyond the descriptive level, by testing hypothesis about possible relationships 
between variables. If there is a relationship between the variables, there ought to be a 
certain association between the distributions of values for one variable and the 
distribution of values for another variable (Landman, 2008: 52, 53).  
More concretely, the analysis is done by first presenting the values on the 
independent variable for each member state. Second, I categorize the member states 
into different groups on the basis on their values with regard to each independent 
variable. The categorization is done with pragmatism in mind, but with the main aim 
of simplifying comparison and to systemize the analysis. When this is done, I conduct 
a bivariate analysis. By quantifying the independent variables and creating scatter plots 
it becomes possible to, via showing the expected differences in numbers between the 
different member states, establish the relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. The discussion about each scatter plot is based on the 
previously created groups. When creating the scatter plots, I will also get a coefficient 
of determination (R2) – also called “the goodness of fit” – which is a descriptive 
measurement of how well the units of analysis gather around the regression line. An 
R2 of zero means no relation between the variables, while an R2 of one means that the 
regression line cuts through all units of analysis. However, one cannot say what is 
considered as a high or low R2 value –  that depends on what we can expect from 
earlier research and on the scholar’s own judgement (Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 177). 
Finally, each section ends with a Pearson correlation test which determines whether 
the relation that is expected to exist is statistically significant, that is, not the result of 
chance.   
An obvious shortcoming of a bivariate analysis is that it is only possible to see that 
there is a relationship between the variables, but not the direction of the relationship. 
However, given that I regard one variable as dependent and the others as independent, 
and that there is support for the causal criteria, a bivariate analysis and correlation tests 
gives me sufficient information to be able to say something about the explanatory 
weight of the included independent variables (Teorell & Svensson, 2007: 177). 
Moreover, it is certainly true that “correlation is not causation” (King et al, 1994: 75). 
However, given that the derived hypotheses have a firm base in theory, the indicators 
are reliable, and that the findings are being compared with earlier research, there are 
good conditions to draw certain causal inferences. As King and colleagues argue, “our 
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uncertainty about causal inferences will never be eliminated […] but this uncertainty 
should not suggest that we avoid attempts at causal inference” (ibid: 76). Rather, the 
most important thing is to provide the reader with the best and honest estimation of 
the uncertainty of the inferences (ibid).  
4.2.2 Case selection 
A basic rule in terms of case selection is that it should allow for the possibility of some 
variation on the dependent variable (King et al, 1994: 129). Accordingly, to explain 
differences with regards to non-compliance with EU environmental law, one needs to 
include both member states that are doing well and those which are doing 
comparatively worse in terms of compliance. To meet this requirement, I have not 
made any case selection at all, meaning that this thesis will incorporate all EU member 
states, apart from Croatia. The decision to not include Croatia is made because it only 
joined the EU in 2013 and therefore does not yet provide for a large transposition 
record, given the conventional transposition deadline of two years after the adoption 
of the directive, which in Croatia’s case is 2015.  
A comparison of the EU-27 in terms of compliance, on the basis of the 
independent variables, mitigates any problems in terms of a potential selection bias 
which easily emerges when choosing cases on the dependent variable (Landman, 2008: 
36f). Moreover, the selection of the EU-27 in the sample aims to correct a shortcoming 
observed by Angelova and colleagues that studies on compliance with EU law rarely 
include both complying northern European states and non-complying southern 
European states (Angelova et al, 2012).  
Further, by including all member states one allows for stronger inferences, since a 
given relationship can be demonstrated to exist with a greater degree of certainty, 
compared to if one has just included a couple of member states. The inclusion of 
relatively many cases also makes it possible to draw inferences that have more general 
applicability (Landman, 2008: 27ff). 
 
 Operationalization of the variables – indicators 
Since this thesis focuses on the macro level of compliance, comparing many countries 
at once, it requires a higher level of abstraction in its specification of concepts 
compared to studies with few cases (Landman, 2008: 20). It is acknowledged within 
political science that concepts such as power and efficiency are by nature highly 
difficult to measure. This in turn increases the risk for conceptual stretching, leaving 
them without meaning and precision. To be able to measure these concepts, I will 
introduce proxy variables, which admittedly is not without any methodological 
problems. The main weakness of using proxy variables is the crudeness of the 
measurement, meaning that it generally only captures one aspect of the social scientific 
concept. However, the risk of stretching the concepts in this study is mitigated by 
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being as transparent and intersubjective as possible throughout the operationalization, 
thus allowing for critique regarding the choices made, which in turn enhances the 
validity of the study (ibid.).  
4.3.1 Measuring issue salience  
As mentioned in sub-section 3.3.1, the theory stipulates that the more salient 
environmental problems are in a member state compared to other issues, the less likely 
it is to breach EU environmental law.  
I follow the example set by Spendzharova and Versluis’ (2013) by using the 
Eurobarometer surveys to capture the salience of environmental issues for the general 
public. The surveys, which consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews 
conducted throughout each member state, are published twice a year, which adds up 
to eight surveys in total between 2012 -2016. The question asked in the surveys is 
“What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the 
moment?” (EC, 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; 2016a; 
2016b). The interviewees are asked to choose two policy areas out of 15, one of them 
being “the environment, climate and energy issues”. The question is framed in the 
same way during all the researched years, which is why it is comparable across the 
selected time period. The relative salience of environmental issues is arguably a better 
measure than the absolute, since decision-makers do not have infinite resources, which 
is why they have to focus on the areas that their constituent consider most important.  
Since this thesis does not aim at explaining difference in compliance across time, 
but rather why non-compliance differs between EU member states, it would be 
cumbersome and not particularly useful to present the public opinion numbers for 
each member state, for each specific year. Instead, I have calculated a mean value of 
issue salience for the period 2012 - 2016. This is possible since the time period 
investigated is relatively short, and the number for each member state is relatively 
stable for each year. However, for the sake of transparency, intersubjectivity and 
replicability, the numbers for each year are presented in the annex.  
I should mention that there could be a possible time lag between issue salience and 
compliance with EU environmental law, meaning that issue salience probably does not 
have an instant effect on how member states comply with EU law, as political 
processes usually are slow. Ideally one would measure the salience of environmental 
issues a couple of years before 2012 in order to capture the possible time lag. However, 
this is not possible since the categories that the interviewees choose from changed in 
2012, making it unfeasible to compare the newer Eurobarometer surveys with the ones 
published before 2012. This is indeed unfortunate, but a possible time lag should not 
be a major issue since there are no indications that the numbers in the years before 
2012 would have been drastically different from 2012-2016, considering that the 
numbers are relatively stable throughout the researched time period.  
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4.3.2 Measuring EU-specific political power  
As discussed in sub-section 3.3.2, it is assumed that the EU-specific political power of 
a member state affects its compliance record, even though it is difficult to know the 
direction of the relationship on beforehand.  
The EU-specific political power, that is, the power distribution within the Council, 
is measured through the Shapley and Shubik Index (SSI). The SSI is one of the most 
well-known power indexes, which offers a method of a priori evaluate the division of 
power among members of legislative bodies. The Shapley value is applied to what in 
mathematical theory are known as simple games. The idea is that the member states in 
the Council can be regarded as “players” in a game. Voters arrive in a random order, 
and when a coalition turns winning, the full credit is given to the last arriving, pivotal 
player. All the different ways in which a voter arrives is taken into consideration. A 
player’s power is thus defined as the proportion of orders when it plays a pivotal role 
in turning a coalition into a winning one. Consequently, the SSI shows that if a decision 
is made, what probability a specific player has in being instrumental to making that 
decision (Petroczy et al, 2016). Thus, the index is a function of the number of votes 
and the majority threshold. 
The data is retrieved from a study conducted by Antonakakis et al (2014) who has 
calculated the proportion of times when a member state is pivotal under direct majority 
voting (DMV4). The sum of the values of this index for all the member states amounts 
to 100. An advantage of using the SSI is that it also captures population, since the 
number of votes that a member state has is based on the size of its population (Börzel 
et al, 2007: 7). 
4.3.3 Measuring government autonomy  
Government autonomy has previously been operationalized in different ways. Some 
previous scholars have categorized the member states into two groups by themselves 
– one with federal states and one with unitary states – to investigate the relationship 
between government autonomy and compliance with EU law (Haverland & Romeijn, 
2007). However, I would argue that such a measurement is too crude, since it does not 
capture the nuances of government autonomy. Instead, I follow the example set by 
Mbaye (2001) using the Regional Authority Index (RAI) as a proxy variable for 
government autonomy. Regional authority and government autonomy are seen as two 
sides of the same coin, meaning that the more authority the regions enjoy in a specific 
member state, the less government autonomy there is. 
The RAI is an index comprising measurements of the authority of regional 
governments in all the member states, over the period 1950-2010 (Hooghe et al, 2016). 
Even though the index does not include the time period in focus of this thesis, the 
figures for 2010 are likely to be stable until 2016, given that regionalization is a very 
                                                       
 
4 DMV is a form of qualified majority voting (QMV) that was introduced after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Any decisions taken under the DMV requires support from 55 per cent of the member states, which in turn must 
represent 65 per cent of the citizens. 
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slow process, and that the numbers for the member states have been very stable 
throughout the 2000s (Hooge et al, 2016). Regional autonomy is measured along ten 
dimensions: institutional depth; policy scope; fiscal autonomy; borrowing autonomy; 
representation; law making; executive control; fiscal control; borrowing control and 
constitutional reform. The index presents a possible summary score between 0 and 40 
for each member state, where zero means no regional authority, and 40 means full 
regional authority.  
The decision to use the RAI is arguably open to criticism, since a lack of 
government autonomy is not relevant in cases where the central government is fully 
responsible for adopting transposing laws and where the federal chamber does not 
hold veto power (Trieb, 2014: 26). However, earlier research has found that the regions 
are highly involved in the implementation of directives in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Austria (Borghetto & Franchino, 2009). All of them 
have been given a high score according to the RAI index. Consequently, even though 
the results should be interpreted with a certain degree of caution, I consider the RAI 
index to be a valid indicator.  
4.3.4 Measuring administrative efficiency  
The concept of administrative efficiency is not used uniformly in the literature and the 
operationalization differs significantly between studies. In this thesis, it is deemed 
necessary to use two indicators for this variable, both of them which are prominent in 
the academic literature, in order to capture both political capacity limitations and 
economic capacity problems (as discussed in section 3.2.3). The indicators used are 
GDP per capita and government effectiveness. 
The first one – GDP per capita – is a general measure for the financial resources 
on which member states can draw to ensure compliance, which is especially relevant 
within the environmental area where compliance tends to be costlier compared to 
other policy areas (Börzel et al, 2007: 9). As previously discussed, resource limitations 
may directly hamper a member state’s compliance efforts and macro-economic factors 
are important by setting the economic and political framework in which public and 
private actors operate (Tallberg, 2002: 613). The data is retrieved from the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicators” and is measured in current US dollars (World 
Bank, 2017). To be able to capture a possible time lag between GDP per capita and 
compliance with EU law, I have calculated an average from 2010 - 2016. One could of 
course discuss whether these two additional years really capture the possible time lag. 
However, pragmatism is practiced, and since the numbers are relatively stable there is 
nothing to suggest that measuring this indicator even earlier than 2010 would affect 
the outcome of the study. For the sake of transparency, the number for each year is 
presented in the annex.  
The other indicator used is “government effectiveness”, which is retrieved from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2017a). The WGI project is based 
exclusively on subjective or perception-based measures of governance, taken from 
surveys of households and firms, as well as assessments produced by various 
organizations. It reports composite indicators of six dimensions of governance, 
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covering 200 countries since 1996, and it is updated annually. Each member state has 
been given a score between - 2,5 (weakest governance performance) and + 2,5 
(strongest governance performance). However, I have transformed the scale so it 
ranges from 1 to 5 instead to produce a positive index, which does not change anything 
in substance. An average score between 2010 - 2016 is calculated in order to capture a 
possible time lag, but the numbers for each specific year is presented in the annex. 
The underlying rationale of including this indicator is that even though a state has 
the sufficient resources to comply with EU law, it might not have the efficient 
machinery to pool and coordinate these resources. Government effectiveness captures 
“perceptions of quality of services; the quality of civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation; and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment toward such policies” (WGI, 2017 b).  
Lastly, the government effectiveness index correlates to a very high degree with 
the Transparency International “Perceived Corruption Index” (Pearson correlation 
coefficient of 0,938), which is why perceived corruption has not been included in the 
analysis. 
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5 Explaining cross-national differences 
In this chapter, I provide an analysis of the effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. The analysis is structured and the variables are operationalized in 
accordance with the methodological framework laid down in the previous chapter. 
Following the analysis of each variable, a final section, 5.5, deals with the combined 
weight of the included variables. 
 Issue salience 
As stated in section 3.3.1, it is predicted that the more salient environmental issues are 
in a member state, the less likely it is to breach EU environmental law. 
Below, I have constructed a bar chart to display the average salience of 
environmental, climate and energy issues in EU-27 between 2012-2016, measured in 
per cent. As seen from the chart, there are big differences between the member states 
in terms of how much weight the citizens attach to environmental issues. The mean 
value is 5,7 per cent5. The rather high mean value is probably the result of the fact that 
Sweden stands out as a clear outlier, with as much as 23,32 per cent of the population 
that consider environmental, climate and energy issues to be one of the two most 
important issues facing their country at the moment. Interestingly – and perhaps a bit 
counterintuitive – environmental, climate and energy issues are highly salient in Malta, 
which is likely to stem from its high import dependency on energy (EC, 2015c). On 
the other extreme end one finds Greece, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania where 
approximately one per cent of the population considers environmental, climate and 
energy issues to be of top importance for their country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
5 Five per cent trimmed mean. 
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Figure 3.  Salience of environmental, climate and energy issues (per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation from EC, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b 
 
Based on the bar chart, the member states can roughly be divided into three groups to 
simplify comparison and allow for a systematic analysis. Group number one includes 
the member states where less than five per cent have mentioned environment as one 
of the two most important issues facing their country (low salience). Group number 
two contains the states where five to ten per cent have mentioned environment 
(moderate salience). Lastly, group number three includes the member states where ten 
or more per cent have mentioned environment as one of the two most important 
issues (high salience).  
After having retrieved and presented the data for the salience of environmental, 
climate and energy issues in each member state, it is now time to investigate the 
relationship between this variable and our dependent variable: the average number of 
infringements between 2012-2016. This is done through a simple scatter plot with the 
dependent variable on the Y-axis and the independent variable on the X-axis. The 
result can be seen below: 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of average salience of environmental, climate and energy issues, and average 
number of infringement proceedings 
 
Source: Author's own compilation from EC, 2017e, and EC, 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; 
2016a; 2016b. 
 
As can be seen from the scatter plot, the picture is rather mixed. Judging from the 
downward regression line, there seems to be a slight negative correlation between the 
average number of infringements and issue salience. In other words, the more people 
care about the environment in a certain member state, the fewer infringements of EU 
environmental law occur. However, the relationship seems to be rather weak, which 
can be seen from the coefficient of determination (R2) of 0,126, meaning that 12,6 per 
cent of the variance on the dependent variable can be explained by the independent 
variable – issue salience.  
5.1.1 Group 1 (low salience) 
Group number one arguably challenges the first hypothesis. Even though these 
member states do not consider environmental issues as salient, there are considerable 
intra-group differences in terms of non-compliance. For instance, environmental 
issues are equally salient in Spain, Greece, Italy and Poland as in Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia. Despite this, these states have completely different compliance records, with 
Spain, Greece, Italy and Poland being the worst laggard states, whilst the Baltic states 
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are among the best compliers. Judging from this group of member states, it seems as 
if issue salience does not have a substantial effect on compliance with EU 
environmental law. 
5.1.2 Group 2 (moderate salience) 
The second group, ranked as environmentally more aware, also shows a mix of 
compliance. While Luxembourg and Czech Republic have compliance records that 
could be expected given that the environment is a quite salient issue in these member 
states, the cases of France, Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom, being among 
the worst laggard states, blur the picture. 
5.1.3 Group 3 (high salience) 
The third group incorporates Sweden, The Netherlands, Malta, Finland and Denmark. 
This group seems to provide certain support for the hypothesis that issue salience 
matter for compliance, since all of these states has less than the average 10,5 
infringement proceedings per year. However, while Sweden is a clear outlier in terms 
of the high percentage of the population that consider environment important, it does 
not comply with EU environmental law substantially better than many of the other 
member states. 
5.1.4 Bivariate (Pearson) correlation  
The mixed picture is confirmed when looking at the results from the bivariate 
correlation test. The result shows that there is a negative correlation of 0,311. 
However, the result is not statistically significant, meaning that one cannot be sure that 
the correlation is not the result of chance. Judging from the analysis above and the 
correlation test, there is little evidence that support the hypothesis that issue salience 
affects member states’ compliance with EU environmental law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 Infringement 
proceedings 
Issue salience 
(%) 
Infringement proceedings Pearson Correlation 1 -,311 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,070 
N 27 27 
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 EU-specific political power 
As mentioned in 3.3.2, I assume that member states’ EU-specific political power 
affects their compliance record. However, it is difficult to say anything about the exact 
relationship between political power and compliance, since the different theoretical 
approaches contradict each other. One variant of the enforcement approach suggests 
that politically powerful member states are less sensitive to external pressure and 
sanctions, which is why they are more likely to infringe EU law. The other variant 
posits that the adaptation cost is smaller for the more politically powerful member 
states. Hence, one would expect the politically powerful states to breach EU law less 
frequently than weaker states. However, before I can go and examine the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, I must first identify how powerful 
the member states are according to the Sharply-Shubik index. The bar chart below 
shows how much EU-specific political power each member state has. 
 
 
Figure 5. Member states’ EU-specific political power 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation from Antonakakis et al, 2014 
 
As one can see from the chart, the political power in the Council is, unsurprisingly, not 
evenly distributed among the member states. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
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Italy and Spain together comprise over 50 per cent of the total amount of political 
power in the Council. On the other side of the spectrum, the smallest member states 
– Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia – do not even comprise five per 
cent of the amount of the power. 
Also in this case, I have categorized the member states into groups to simplify 
comparison. Group number one contains the less politically powerful member states 
with a SSI score of less than 3,5 and group number two consists of the comparatively 
more powerful member state with a SSI score of more than 3,5.  
After having collected data and assigned a value on the independent variable for 
each member state, the dependent variable is introduced once again to establish the 
relationship between the variables. Yet again, I have constructed a scatter plot with the 
dependent variable on the Y-axis, and the independent variable on the X-axis. 
 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot of EU-specific power and the average number of infringement proceedings 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation from EC, 2017e and Antonakakis et al 2014. 
 
The scatter plot provides some interesting findings: It would appear that there is a 
positive correlation between infringements and political power. This means that the 
more powerful a member state is, the more it tends to breach EU environmental law. 
Considering the coefficient of determination of 0,268 – meaning that 28,6 per cent of 
the variance in infringements could be explained by member states political power – 
this variable seems to carry certain explanatory weight.  
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5.2.1 Group 1 (less politically powerful) 
Interestingly, this group contains all the best compliers with EU environmental law 
and almost all member states that are complying to a medium degree. This suggests 
that in general, the politically weaker member states are rather successful in complying 
with EU environmental law. However, as can be seen in the scatter plot, there are also 
states that breach EU environmental law more than the average 10,5 times per year, 
namely Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Portugal and Belgium. Moreover, there is 
one clear outlier also in this case – Greece. Greece has a SSI score of 2,33, which is 
approximately the same as the Czech Republic, but in contrast to the Czech Republic’s 
8 infringements per year, it has an average of 25,6 infringements per year which makes 
it the worst laggard state. This stands in contrast to what the theory stipulates, which 
could possibly be explained by what is commonly called the “Mediterranean 
syndrome”. This means that even though Greece with its weak political power would 
have the political will to comply, it fails due to its expected low level of socio-economic 
development, and lack of administrative capacity to effectively implement 
environmental policies (Börzel, 2003: 30). This is tested in section 5.4. 
The analysis of the first group thus suggests that political power seems to carry 
certain explanatory weight, even though it cannot explain the full range of the cross-
national differences with regards to non-compliance. 
5.2.2 Group 2 (more politically powerful) 
The second group comprises the more powerful member states, with a SSI score of 
more than 3,5. These states are, in a hierarchal order from the least to the most 
politically powerful: Romania, Poland, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. All of these member states breach EU environmental law more than the 
average 10,5 times per year. In fact, this group contains four out of the five worst 
laggard states, which gives further evidence to the hypothesis that member states’ 
political power in the Council affects the level of compliance with EU environmental 
law. However, one should note that even though Germany and the United Kingdom 
have plenty of political power, they are complying approximately to the same degree 
as the worst performers in group number one, which arguably blurs the picture 
somewhat. 
5.2.3 Bivariate (Pearson) correlation 
The bivariate correlation test confirms the positive correlation found in the scatter 
plot. The test shows that there is a correlation of 0,529 between member states’ 
political power and compliance record, which in this context could be considered as a 
rather strong result. More importantly however, the test shows that the relation found 
is significant on a 0,01 level, meaning that the correlation is not likely to be the result 
of chance.  
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From the findings of this variable one can conclude that it seems to be able to explain 
some of the variance on the dependent variable, given that the member states in group 
one in general uphold a better compliance record than the member states in the second 
group. However, there are exceptions to the rule, most notably Greece. Hence, I have 
found certain support to the hypothesis that member states’ political weight translates 
into indifference, or even resistance vis-à-vis external pressure from the Commission 
and other member states. Even though political power alone does not seem to explain 
the full picture of non-compliance, this analysis has demonstrated that it is possible to 
reject the assumption that politically powerful member states are complying to a higher 
degree due to their success in the legislative process.  
 
 Government autonomy 
As stated in section 3.3.3, some member states are dependent on their relatively 
autonomous regions for the implementation of European policies, which complicates 
the process. Hence, it is assumed that these countries breach EU law more often than 
member states with a high level of government autonomy.  
Below I have created a bar chart based on the Regional Authority Index (RAI). 
Not surprisingly, the federal state of Germany has the highest RAI score, followed by 
Spain which is not officially a federal state, but is still highly dependent on its regions 
(Börzel, 2003: 29). On the other end one finds the smaller member states such as 
Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus and Estonia, where one can assume that their small size 
makes a high degree of regional authority unfeasible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Infringement 
proceedings 
EU- specific 
political power 
(SSI) 
Infringement proceedings Pearson Correlation 1 ,529** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,005 
N 27 27 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 7. Member states' degree of regional authority (RAI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's own compilation from Hooghe et al, 2016. 
 
Once again, the member states can be split into three groups based on their RAI score 
to simplify comparison. The first group contains the member states with a low degree 
of regional authority, with a score from one to six. The second group contains the 
member states with a medium degree of regional authority, with a score from seven 
to 12. The third and last group comprises the federal and semi-federal states, with a 
score of more than 12.  
The dependent variable is again introduced using a scatter plot: 
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Figure 8. Scatterplot of the degree of regional authority (RAI) and the average number of infringement 
proceedings 
Source: Author's own compilation from EC, 2017e and Hooghe et al, 2016. 
 
As can be seen from the scatter plot there is a positive relationship between regional 
authority and infringements, that is, the more regional authority a member state has, 
the more it tends to breach EU environmental law. Contrariwise, the more 
government autonomy a member state has, the less it tends to breach EU 
environmental law. The member states are rather neatly organized around the 
regression line with some exceptions, and the coefficient of determination of 0, 245 
indicates that there is a decent correlation between the two variables. 
5.3.1 Group 1 (high government autonomy) 
Group number one comprises the member states with a RAI score from zero to six, 
and subsequently the member states with the highest government autonomy. This 
group gives certain support to the hypothesis since it includes many of the best 
compliers, including the Baltic states, Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland and Cyprus. 
Although the member states in this group arguably comply substantially in general, an 
explanation solely based on government autonomy fails to provide a full explanation 
since it also includes member states which breach EU law more than average, namely 
Portugal, Bulgaria and Slovenia.  
  41 
5.3.2 Group 2 (moderate government autonomy) 
The second group includes the member states with a RAI score of seven to 12, that is, 
the member states with moderate government autonomy. This group also gives certain 
support to the hypothesis, since it seems as if the member states in this group in general 
comply to a lesser extent that the ones in the first group. However, the picture is not 
clear-cut since the group includes both member states that breach EU law less than 
average and more than average. Greece is an outlier once again, and the theory fails to 
explain why it has such a high degree of non-compliance, given that it has roughly the 
same government autonomy as Hungary, but with a substantially higher number of 
infringements. 
5.3.3 Group 3 (low government autonomy) 
Group number three gives a rather mixed picture. It contains two of the worst 
compliers – Spain and Italy – which gives certain support to the hypothesis. Moreover, 
France, Germany, Belgium and Austria breach EU environmental law more than 
average. However, they are doing better in terms of compliance compared to many of 
the member states in group number two, which makes it difficult to draw any far-
reaching conclusions. This could possibly be explained by these member states’ higher 
level of government effectiveness (see section 5.4). Interestingly, there is one clear 
outlier in this case, namely the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a fairly low degree 
of government autonomy, yet it manages to sustain a high degree of compliance. If 
this variable alone was to explain compliance, this would not have been the result. This 
indicates that other variables might affect member states’ compliance records. 
 
5.3.4 Bivariate (Pearson) Correlation 
As can be seen from the correlation test, there is a positive correlation between regional 
authority and infringements, with a Pearson’s r of 0, 518, which indicates a rather 
strong correlation. This is in line with the theory, since I assume that regional authority 
a government autonomy are each other’s opposites. Hence, there is a negative 
correlation between government autonomy and infringements. It is important to note 
the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0,01 level, meaning that the 
correlation found is not the result of chance. 
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To conclude, it seems as if there is a relation between member states’ degree of 
government autonomy and non-compliance with EU environmental law. The analysis 
shows that member states which are relatively more dependent on their regions in 
general have a more difficult time complying with EU environmental law, compared 
to the member states with a high degree of government autonomy. Previous research 
on the EU-12 and EU-15 compliance with EU law within other policy areas have come 
to similar conclusions, that regionalization and federalism contribute to transposition 
and compliance problems (cf. Mbaye, 2001; Haverland & Romeijn, 2007; Borghetto & 
Franchino, 2010). 
  
 Administrative efficiency 
As mentioned in section 4.3.4, administrative efficiency is measured via two indicators 
– GDP per capita and government effectiveness. The former is a general measure for 
the financial resources on which member states can draw to ensure compliance, 
whereas the latter one is a measure on a state’s capacity to pool and coordinate these 
resources 
5.4.1 GDP per capita 
The data for the GDP per capita in current US dollars is retrieved from the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicators”, and an average has been calculated from 
2010 - 2016 in order to capture a possible time lag between GDP per capita and 
compliance with EU environmental law. As one can see from the bar chart below, the 
GDP per capita differs significantly between the different member states, with the 
poorest member state being Bulgaria with an average GDP per capita of $ 7415 and 
the richest state being Luxembourg as a clear outlier with $ 109 306, which is almost 
twice as much as the second richest member state, Denmark. 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Infringement 
proceedings Regional authority 
Infringement proceedings Pearson Correlation 1 ,518** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,006 
N 27 27 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 9. Member states' average GDP per capita ($) 
Source: Author's own compilation from World Bank, 2017. 
 
To simplify comparison one can roughly divide the member states into three groups 
on the basis of their GDP per capita. Group number one comprises the poorer 
member states which have a GDP per capita of 0 to $ 20 000 (from Bulgaria to the 
Czech Republic). Group number two includes the member states with a GDP per 
capita of $ 20 000 and $ 40 000 (from Portugal to Italy) and the last group consists of 
the member states with a GDP per capita of $ 40 000 or more (from France to 
Luxembourg). 
After having retrieved data for each member state, I shall now introduce the 
dependent variables once again through a scatter plot, with the dependent variable on 
the X-axis and the independent on the Y-axis. 
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Figure 10.  Scatterplot of the average GDP per capita ($) and average number of infringement proceedings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author's own compilation from EC, 2017e and World Bank, 2017. 
 
As can be seen from the scatter plot, there seems to be a slight negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and the average number of infringements. However, the 
result is far from clear and it is difficult to identify a pattern. This mixed picture is 
somewhat confirmed by the low coefficient of determination (R2) of 0,069. 
5.4.2 Group 1 (low GDP per capita) 
The first group includes the poorer member states with an average GDP per capita of 
0 to $ 20 000. This group includes member states such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Slovakia which are breaching EU environmental law more than average. However, 
it also includes three of the best compliers – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – which 
makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the relationship between the variables. 
All in all, little evidence is found in this group to support the hypothesis that poorer 
member states are complying to a lesser degree than richer ones. 
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5.4.3 Group 2 (moderate GDP per capita) 
The second group includes the moderately wealthy member states, with a GDP per 
capita between $ 20 000 and $ 40 000. In theory, these member states would comply 
to a higher degree than the first group. However, that is not the case since this group 
comprises three of the worst compliers, namely Greece, Spain and Italy, which have 
about the same GDP per capita as Malta, which is doing considerably better. Hence, 
neither this group supports the hypothesis since the member states in this group are 
complying to the same extent, or even less, than the poorer member states in group 
number one. 
5.4.4 Group 3 (high GDP per capita) 
The last group contains the richest member states, which have a GDP per capita of 
more than $ 40 000. This group does not give further support to the hypothesis either, 
since it includes the complying Nordic states, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, but also states that are breaching EU law more than the average 10,5 
times per year, such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and Belgium, 
which in all likelihood have the sufficient financial resources to comply with EU 
environmental law. I can thus conclude that the picture is at best mixed and there is 
no clear-cut pattern. 
5.4.5 Bivariate (Pearson) correlation  
The correlation test shows that there is a weak negative correlation of – 0,245. 
However, as can also be seen from the test, the correlation is not statistically significant 
at the five per cent level, which is expected given the mixed picture in the three 
previously described groups. 
 
 
 
To summarize the analysis of this variable; the financial resources on which member 
states can draw to ensure compliance does not have a substantial effect on compliance 
with EU environmental law. This is in line with previous studies on the EU-12 and 
EU-15, which have equally found that the command of resources appears to be less 
an issue in the EU (cf. Mbaye, 2001; Börzel et al, 2007; Steuneberg, 2006).  
 
Correlations 
 
Infringement 
proceedings GDP/Capita ($) 
Infringement proceedings Pearson Correlation 1 -,245 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,217 
N 27 27 
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5.4.6 Government effectiveness 
Having the theory in mind, I expect a negative relationship between government 
effectiveness and non-compliance. Below, a bar chart is created based on the member 
states’ government effectiveness. The scoring is based on the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) for the years 2010 - 2016. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, 
the top 10 member states in terms of government efficiency are situated in the north 
- western Europe, whilst the southern (Italy and Greece) and eastern member states 
(Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary) seem to perform comparatively worse.  
 
 
Figure 11. Member states' average degree of government effectiveness 
Source: 
Author's own compilation from WGI, 2017a. 
 
Also in this case, the member states can roughly be divided into three groups. The first 
group contains the member states with the weakest governance performance, with a 
score between two and three. The second group comprises the member states with a 
score between three and four, and the third group contains the member states with 
the strongest governance performance, with a score between four and five.  
Below, I have created a scatter plot to establish the relationship between 
government effectiveness and non-compliance with EU environmental law. 
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Figure 12. Scatterplot of the average degree of government effectiveness and the average number of 
infringement proceedings 
Source: Author's own compilation from EC, 2017e and WGI, 2017a. 
 
The scatter plot indicates that there is a negative relationship between infringements 
and government effectiveness, meaning that the stronger governance performance, the 
higher degree of compliance with EU environmental law. This relationship is in line 
with the hypothesis. The coefficient of determination of 0,177 indicates that the 
variable seems to account for at least some variance on the dependent variable. 
5.4.7 Group 1 (low government effectiveness) 
The results from group one is interesting. As can be seen from the scatter plot above, 
this group contains two of the three worst laggards – Greece and Italy. Hence, this 
could explain why Greece, with its limited political power and moderate level of 
government autonomy, is not complying to the same degree as the other politically 
weaker member states. One could thus theorize that they have the political will to 
comply, but lack the sufficient administrative machinery.  
Moreover, group number one also includes Romania and Bulgaria, both which 
have a weak governance performance and are breaching EU environmental law more 
than the average 10,5 times per year. One could thus claim that group number one 
provides certain support for the hypothesis. 
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5.4.8 Group 2 (moderate government effectiveness) 
Group two consists of the member state with a score between three and four. In 
general, the member states in this group seem to perform better than the ones in the 
first group. However, mainly Spain, but also France and Poland blur the picture 
somewhat. Spain is an interesting case as it seems to do moderately well in terms of 
governance performance – better than for instance the Baltic states – yet it breaches 
EU law on average 25 times per year. Hence, this group shows that government 
effectiveness alone cannot account for all the variance on the dependent variable, given 
that the Baltic states have a lower governance performance score than Spain and 
France, but they still comply to a higher degree. Latvia is another interesting case since 
it is ranked 19th of the 27 member states in terms of government efficiency, yet it 
outperforms all others in terms of compliance. Hence, theory fails to explain the 
behavior of the outliers, that is, why most notably the Baltic states have such a high 
degree of compliance, and Spain and France have such a high degree of non-
compliance given their moderate levels of government effectiveness. 
5.4.9 Group 3 (high government effectiveness) 
Finally, group three comprises the best member states in terms of government 
efficiency, with a score of more than four. This group includes four countries which 
breach EU environmental law more than average, namely United Kingdom, Germany, 
Austria and Belgium, but also several member states that breach EU environmental 
law less than average. These member states are the Nordic states, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. In general, this group seem to perform better than the other two groups 
as there are no big outliers in terms of non-compliance. While this group does not 
support the hypothesis, it does not reject it either.  
5.4.10 Bivariate (Pearson) correlation 
The bivariate correlation test shows that there indeed is a negative correlation between 
the average number of infringements and government effectiveness. The coefficient 
of determination of -0,418 indicates that it is a decent correlation, which is also 
statistically significant.  
 
 
Correlations 
 
Infringement 
proceedings 
Government 
effectiveness 
Infringement proceedings Pearson Correlation 1 -,418* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,030 
N 27 27 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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To summarize this analysis, there seems to be some support in group number one for 
the hypothesis, since it shows that weak or moderate government effectiveness is a 
similar trait in the worst complier states. However, the member states in group number 
two, and to a certain degree group number three complicate the picture somewhat. 
One could thus conclude that this variable seems to bear some explanatory weight for 
compliance with EU environmental law. Judging from these findings, compliance 
appears to depend more on member states’ capacity to pool and mobilize existing 
resources than on their GDP per capita.  
 These findings are in line with much of the earlier research, even though the 
operationalization of the variable have differed throughout the literature (cf. Mbaye, 
2001; Börzel et al, 2007; Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013).  
One should note that compared to the Western member states with relatively low 
government effectiveness (Greece, Italy, Spain), the Central Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) with similar government effectiveness score (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and the Baltic states) are still faster in 
transposing and complying with EU environmental law. This puzzling phenomenon 
could possibly be explained by the particular skills which the CEECs’ were granted 
during the pre-accession period when they had to transpose vast amounts of EU rules 
into national law, rather than the general administrative capabilities measured here 
(Börzel & Sedelmeier, 2017; Zhelyazkova et al, 2017). 
 The variables’ combined weight 
After having investigated the relationship between the dependent variable –  
infringement proceedings – and the independent variables, it seems as if the selected 
variables separately cannot explain the full picture of macro-compliance, even if certain 
support for three of the hypothesis can be found across the population of states. The 
findings of this study suggest going further and combining the management and 
enforcement approach in order to maximize the explanatory weigh of the variables. 
However, before doing that, a summary of the analysis is provided.  
Regarding the first variable – issue salience – it does not hold up well under 
empirical testing. The big discrepancies with regards to non-compliance in group 
number one, comprising the member states where environmental issues have low 
salience, and the fact that the correlation is not statistically significant underlines the 
notion that this variable does not bear any significant explanatory weight – at least 
under the current circumstances. 
Regarding the second variable – EU-specific political power – there is a positive 
relationship between member states’ political power and non-compliance. In general, 
it seems as if the more politically powerful member states tend to breach EU 
environmental law more often than the weaker ones, which according to theory is 
because their political power has translated into obstinacy and indifference vis-à-vis 
external rules. Greece, which belongs to the politically weaker member states, is one 
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notable exception which theory fails to explain, given its high degree of non-
compliance. 
Concerning government autonomy, some support can be found that it has an 
effect on member states’ compliance record. It seems as if the member states with a 
low RAI score and consequently a high degree of government autonomy tend to 
comply with EU environmental law to a higher degree than the member states with a 
low degree of government autonomy. However, there are exceptions also in this case, 
most notably the Netherlands, which is complying to a higher degree than expected 
given its low government autonomy, and Greece which I would have expected to 
comply to a higher degree given its moderate level of government autonomy. 
The fourth and last variable – administrative efficiency – was measured through 
two indicators: GDP per capita and government effectiveness. The GDP per capita 
does not seem to matter for member states’ compliance with EU environmental law. 
A pattern is difficult to find, and the correlation is not statistically significant. In 
contrast, government effectiveness appears to have certain effect on member states’ 
compliance records. In general, member states with higher government effectiveness 
tend to breach EU environmental law more seldom. This argument is supported by 
the fact that the worst laggard states all have a low or moderate level of government 
effectiveness. However, government effectiveness does not explain the full picture of 
non-compliance, since many of the member states with a high score do not perform 
significantly better than the ones with lower scores. Most notably the Baltic states 
perform better than expected, given their moderate levels of government effectiveness. 
As mentioned above, a few interesting patterns can be identified if one combines 
the variables. First, it seems as if the politically most powerful member states, which 
also have a low to moderate level of government effectiveness, are the ones that breach 
EU environmental law to the biggest extent. These member states are Spain and Italy. 
Hence, is seems as if the combination of low government effectiveness and great 
political power results in an inability to comply, and the necessary political weight to 
be obstinate. Also at lower level of political power, Greece and Romania are much 
more obstinate than for instance the Netherlands, which features higher government 
effectiveness. The other politically powerful member states – France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom – also breach EU environmental law more often than average, 
but not to the same degree as Spain and Italy, which could be explained by their 
comparatively higher levels of government effectiveness. Hence, one could theorize 
that even though France, Germany and the United Kingdom have similar power of 
obstinacy levels as Spain and Italy, their higher levels of government effectiveness 
make the non-compliance promoting effects less pronounced. Admittedly, Poland 
challenges this notion since it has considerable political power and moderate 
government effectiveness, yet it has the exact same number of infringements as 
France, which enjoys higher levels of government effectiveness. Poland could thus be 
the exception that proves the rule. It could also be the case that the ministries in Poland 
gained particular skills during its accession to the EU when they had to transpose a 
vast amount of EU law into national law, which is not shown in the general 
administrative capacities measured in this thesis (cf. Zhelyazkova et al, 2017). 
The argument made above is supported by the fact that the best compliers appear 
to be the politically weaker member states with moderate to high levels of government 
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effectiveness. These states are for instance Luxembourg, Malta and Denmark, the 
Baltic states, Hungary and Malta. These states’ high degree of compliance could thus 
be explained by their low obstinacy levels, their sensitivity towards pressure from the 
Commission and other member states, and the fact that they have the necessary 
administrative capacity to transpose and comply with EU environmental law. 
Moreover, by promoting certain values, including environmental issues, through 
benchmarking, meaning by “practicing what is preached”, the smaller member states 
can gain influence and power in the EU, despite their lack of GDP and military 
strength. (Howard Grøn & Wivel, 2011:534f). Greece is identified as an outlier, given 
its low political power and high degree of non-compliance. However, that could 
possibly be explained by its very low government effectiveness.  
As stated above, lower degrees of government autonomy seem to result in higher 
numbers of infringements. The analysis shows, inter alia, that the best compliers are 
the member states with a high degree of government autonomy, whereas the worst 
(Italy and Spain) have a low degree of government autonomy. However, theory fails 
to explain why Austria, Belgium and Germany do not have the same degree of non-
compliance as Italy, France and Spain, given their similar RAI score. If one combines 
government autonomy with government effectiveness one could however find one 
possible explanation to this pattern, since Austria, Belgium and Germany all enjoy 
strong government effectiveness, while Italy, France and Spain have low or moderate 
levels. Hence, one could theorize that government effectiveness mitigates the negative 
effects that follows from low government autonomy.  
To summarize the analysis, the current structure of this study, the included 
variables, and the current operationalization of these, fail to provide a full explanation 
of the member states’ different degrees of compliance. If they did, the results would 
have looked very different. Thus, it seems as if additional variables are needed in order 
to nuance the picture and to provide a better and more comprehensive explanation for 
the patterns of compliance. Moreover, it could be the case that other variables than 
the ones included in this thesis are better at capturing the full picture of compliance. 
However, I can conclude that member states’ EU-specific political power, 
government autonomy and government effectiveness carry more explanatory weight 
compared to issue salience and GDP per capita. From the analysis made in this thesis, 
I cannot conclude with certainty, however, which of these variables carries the most 
explanatory weight or if there are other, intervening variables, that affect the 
relationship. Admittedly, this makes it difficult to establishing strong causal links. The 
former of these variables alone, and even more so combined have, however, been 
proven to be rather successful in accounting for the compliance record of several of 
the member states. Hence, this study has added one more piece to the already sizable 
puzzle of member states’ differing degrees of compliance with EU law.  
If I were to reiterate what was said in section 3.1, there is a discussion within 
academia about whether transposition and compliance with EU law should be seen as 
a political or administrative exercise. The results of this study indicate that the 
management and enforcement approach should not be seen as mutually exclusive or 
as competing explanations. Instead, there are benefits of combining the two 
approaches, since they together provide a more nuanced explanation to member states’ 
non-compliance with EU environmental law. In essence, they appear to reinforce each 
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other, and one can thus conclude that both political will and capacities seem to matter 
for member states’ non-compliance with EU environmental law. This also answers the 
question asked in the title of this thesis:  many of the laggard states are both inefficient 
and obstinate! 
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6 Concluding remarks: Factors affecting 
compliance 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study, both regarding the methodology, 
results and future research.  
This thesis started with a simple question, namely “Why did the degree of non-
compliance with EU environmental law differ between member states in the period 
2012 to 2016?” In this study, I have demonstrated that issue salience and GDP per 
capita, in the current operationalization, did not have any significant effect on member 
states’ compliance with EU environmental law. EU-specific political power, 
government autonomy and government effectiveness on the other hand - which is also 
the answer to the research question – all appeared to carry certain explanatory weigh, 
both alone but even more so combined. Consequently, this study has demonstrated 
that the management approach and the enforcement approach should not be treated 
as separate approaches or as competing explanations. Instead, there are benefits of 
combining these. 
EU-specific political power had a negative effect on member states compliance 
with EU law, which according to theory is because their power has translated into 
indifference against external rules. By combining this variable with government 
effectiveness one could see that politically stronger member states, with lower degrees 
of government effectiveness constituted the worst compliers. Contrariwise, the best 
compliers were the politically weaker member states with moderate to high levels of 
government effectiveness. Moreover, member states with low degrees of government 
autonomy had in general higher degrees of non-compliance. However, also in this case 
it seemed as if government effectiveness mitigated the negative effects that stem from 
a low degree of government autonomy.  
Arguably, even when the variables are combined, they fail to explain the full picture 
of compliance. Although this study has identified important patterns of compliance, a 
significant amount of variation on the dependent variable still remains to be explained. 
This in turn indicates that there are other variables at play that should be included, or 
that the current indicators should be recalibrated to construct a better and more 
comprehensive model of explanation. 
King and colleagues (1994: 33) argue that researchers always should approach the 
issue of causal inferences with skepticism and alternative hypothesis in mind. This 
study has found that politically more powerful member states are more likely to 
infringe EU environmental law, due to their high levels of obstinacy. Admittedly, there 
could be other explanations to why politically mightier member states tend to breach 
EU environmental law more than the weaker ones. One could for instance theorize 
that the politically stronger member states have more and bigger ministries which in 
turn causes inefficiency, longer transposition times or even incorrect implementation. 
Moreover, one could assume that the politically powerful member states have larger 
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economies, bigger industries and thus more potential veto players and bigger 
incentives not to comply with EU environmental law. Accordingly, it is possible that 
EU-specific political power in fact functions as an underlying variable. If a future study 
is to be conducted on compliance, using the same population, it would thus be 
recommendable to try to deconstruct the EU-specific political power variable further, 
to identify the causal mechanisms leading to non-compliance.  
Further, good science tries to go beyond particular events to more general 
knowledge by seeking generalizations (King et al, 1994: 35). So what does this study 
teach us about non-compliance in international organizations? One should always be 
careful to generalize findings on the EU to other international organizations, since the 
EU is considered a system sui generis, meaning that it is neither a state nor an “ordinary” 
international organization (Peterson & Shackleton, 2012: 2). However, this should not 
deter scholars from discussing generalizations since all organizations are unique in their 
own way – one just needs to climb up the ladder of abstraction. The EU is arguably 
unique in many ways, and it is the most legalized system in the world. However, its 
institutionalized compliance mechanisms can also be found elsewhere (Börzel et al, 
2007: 23). Hence, this thesis has made a couple of contributions that go beyond this 
study. The findings of this study show that politically powerful states with low 
administrative capacities, and especially those with a low degree of government 
autonomy, tend to be unsuccessful in complying with international environmental 
rules.  
This leads to this study’s proposals for future research. A first proposal for future 
research is to actually compare the findings of this study with other international 
organizations to investigate if they hold true also in other multilateral fora. By looking 
at how states comply with rules in other international organization such as the Word 
Trade Organization (WTO), which has similar institutionalized compliance 
mechanisms as the EU, a more nuanced understanding could be gained of the 
underlying motives for compliance, and what promotes rule-abidance. That would add 
greatly to the compliance literature, especially since the members of the WTO are 
much more heterogeneous than the EU member states in terms of administrative 
capacity, political power and regional autonomy.   
 Secondly, since the included variables did not manage to explain the full picture 
of compliance, future studies could greatly benefit from not only including data on 
state characteristics, but also policy-related explanations. This would most likely be a 
fruitful way to account for the variation in non-compliance between the member 
states. 
Thirdly, even though it was stated in section 4.1 that there are no indications of a 
prosecution bias on the part of the Commission, the best thing to shed more light on 
the effect of the included variables on compliance would be to conduct a similar study, 
using another measurement of the dependent variable. This could be done by for 
instance controlling for the Commission’s preferences or using transposition data (cf. 
Trieb, 2014: 21). That would arguably strengthen the findings of this thesis. 
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8 Annex 
 Infringement proceedings 2012 – 2016 
      
Member state 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 11 16 12 11 14 
Belgium 6 10 23 7 13 
Bulgaria 9 17 15 12 12 
Cyprus 6 14 9 8 7 
The Czech 
Republic 3 7 9 11 10 
Denmark 2 8 4 4 5 
Estonia 6 9 2 3 2 
Finland 6 14 6 7 8 
France 8 19 19 18 18 
Germany 9 12 13 15 15 
Greece 16 25 36 27 24 
Hungary 9 7 4 3 8 
Ireland 3 8 7 13 7 
Italy 26 25 18 20 15 
Latvia 7 5 6 3 1 
Lithuania 1 3 1 2 3 
Luxembourg 2 5 2 3 2 
Malta 9 5 5 2 5 
The Netherlands 2 4 2 1 2 
Poland 11 20 20 15 16 
Portugal 21 13 10 8 9 
Romania 9 13 30 15 12 
Slovakia 14 17 14 11 11 
Slovenia 9 18 12 14 13 
Spain 9 29 30 28 26 
Sweden 5 11 9 8 6 
The United 
Kingdom 9 18 16 13 12 
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  Issue salience (%) 
 
 
 GDP per capita 
 
 
Member state 2012 a 2012 b 2013 a 2013 b 2014a 2014b 2015a 2015 b 2016a  2016b 
Austria 7 7 7 6 12 10 9 5 7 8 
Belgium 12 9 3 12 12 11 8 9 10 10 
Bulgaria 4 9 3 2 3 4 3 3 2 3 
Cyprus 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
The Czech 
Republic 3 3 3 5 6 5 6 6 5 4 
Denmark 9 11 9 11 11 13 9 12 10 9 
Estonia 2 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 
Finland 13 14 6 13 13 13 13 10 13 17 
France 5 6 4 6 8 8 8 7 9 10 
Germany 10 11 10 11 9 10 7 6 6 7 
Greece 1 0 1 1 2 4 1 1 0 1 
Hungary 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 
Ireland 3 2 1 2 4 4 3 5 7 6 
Italy 3 3 1 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 
Latvia 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
Lithuania 1 3 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 7 8 4 9 8 7 7 9 12 13 
Malta 14 15 22 16 13 16 17 16 12 15 
The 
Netherlands 9 7 6 10 12 11 14 14 15 21 
Poland 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 
Portugal 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 2 
Romania 2 3 1 3 2 4 4 3 4 4 
Slovakia 4 5 0 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 
Slovenia 5 6 1 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 
Spain 1 1 0 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 
Sweden 17 25 19 24 31 27 25 22 22 24 
The United 
Kingdom 6 7 4 9 7 7 5 5 5 6 
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Member 
state 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Belgium 44380,23741 47702,77415 44740,5717 46510,38647 47439,39684 40356,875 41096,1573 
Austria 46657,0629 51126,74139 48333,57273 50504,71532 51322,63997 43665,00947 44176,51522 
Bulgaria 6843,263289 7813,803499 7378,025539 7674,860559 7853,335191 6993,47736 7350,795801 
Cyprus 30818,46396 32233,83942 28951,15556 27907,96736 27340,88382 23075,1127 23324,20174 
Denmark 58041,41122 61753,66007 58507,50021 61191,19263 62425,5392 53014,64416 53417,66428 
Czech 
Republic 19764,01554 21717,45794 19729,87051 19916,01939 19744,55861 17556,9243 18266,54969 
Estonia 14638,60482 17454,84342 17421,89022 19029,7746 19941,45532 17074,92091 17574,68736 
Finland 46202,41516 50790,72415 47415,55987 49638,07713 49914,61864 42405,39744 43090,24751 
France 40703,34279 43810,20088 40838,02444 42554,12205 42955,24287 36526,77011 36854,96828 
Germany 41785,55691 46810,32796 44065,24891 46530,91143 47902,65288 41176,88158 41936,05858 
Greece 26917,75898 25916,29353 22242,68193 21874,8195 21673,78107 18007,78991 18103,96932 
Hungary 13025,53379 14048,87958 12834,32349 13613,60147 14117,97668 12365,62603 12664,84744 
Ireland 48538,58776 52567,52568 49231,36254 52034,76736 55503,32623 60664,1044 61606,48294 
Italy 35849,37364 38334,68477 34814,12436 35370,27441 35396,66517 30049,14755 30527,2682 
Latvia 11326,21947 13702,68947 13822,80559 15032,22924 15725,01374 13666,58336 14118,06391 
Lithuania 11984,86857 14357,73679 14341,08306 15712,82376 16554,97139 14252,42853 14879,6803 
Malta 21087,79469 22821,8407 21930,80836 23930,18808 26180,92599 23819,4636 25058,17061 
Netherlands 50338,25483 53540,60536 49474,70561 51574,48942 52157,40687 44292,88473 45294,78 
Portugal 22538,65408 23196,18375 20577,40264 21618,73534 22077,53613 19220,00681 19813,30825 
Poland 12599,52486 13893,18768 13145,10484 13780,54911 14341,6705 12565,9876 12372,41706 
Romania 8297,483621 9200,277825 8558,397606 9585,266593 10020,27733 8958,788593 9474,130604 
Slovak 
Republic 16600,61359 18187,15744 17274,6423 18191,61279 18595,15111 16089,74846 16495,98768 
Slovenia 23437,47202 24985,24827 22486,47167 23150,31799 24020,67286 20729,86383 21304,57016 
Spain 30736,00228 31834,21816 28562,29324 29210,09342 29600,47225 25683,84565 26528,49179 
Sweden 52076,25591 59593,28711 57134,07707 60283,24522 59180,19898 50585,25847 51599,86887 
United 
Kingdom 38709,91166 41240,42486 41538,30726 42407,37101 46412,11727 43929,69081 39899,38839 
Luxembourg 104965,3061 115761,5077 106749,0136 113751,8005 119172,7418 101909,8223 102831,3215 
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 Government effectiveness 
 
Member state 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 1,84 1,62 1,58 1,59 1,57 1,48 1,51 
Belgium 1,58 1,66 1,60 1,61 1,38 1,44 1,33 
Bulgaria 0,11 0,11 0,14 0,16 0,08 0,21 0,29 
Cyprus 1,53 1,56 1,39 1,37 1,14 1,05 0,98 
The Czech Republic 0,91 0,93 0,93 0,89 1,02 1,05 1,06 
Denmark 2,1 2,1 1,98 1,99 1,82 1,85 1,89 
Estonia 1,09 1,08 0,95 0,97 1,02 1,07 1,12 
Finland 2,23 2,24 2,22 2,17 2,00 1,81 1,85 
France 1,43 1,36 1,34 1,48 1,40 1,44 1,41 
Germany 1,57 1,55 1,59 1,54 1,73 1,74 1,74 
Greece 0,56 0,51 0,32 0,46 0,40 0,26 0,21 
Hungary 0,67 0,67 0,63 0,65 0,53 0,50 0,45 
Ireland 1,35 1,46 1,55 1,49 1,60 1,53 1,35 
Italy 0,44 0,38 0,42 0,46 0,37 0,45 0,52 
Latvia 0,71 0,7 0,84 0,89 0,96 1,09 1,00 
Lithuania 0,74 0,7 0,83 0,83 0,98 1,19 1,09 
Luxembourg 1,72 1,75 1,67 1,63 1,65 1,72 1,69 
Malta 1,19 1,2 1,25 1,26 1,03 0,85 0,95 
The Netherlands 1,73 1,79 1,81 1,78 1,82 1,83 1,84 
Poland 0,64 0,62 0,68 0,72 0,83 0,80 0,69 
Portugal 1,01 0,95 1,04 1,23 0,99 1,22 1,22 
Romania -0,27 -0,33 -0,31 -0,07 -0,07 -0,06 -0,17 
Slovakia 0,84 0,83 0,84 0,79 0,88 0,84 0,89 
Slovenia 1,03 0,99 1,03 1,01 1,01 0,97 1,12 
Spain 0,99 1,03 1,12 1,15 1,16 1,17 1,12 
Sweden 2 1,97 1,96 1,91 1,80 1,82 1,79 
The United Kingdom 1,57 1,56 1,55 1,50 1,63 1,74 1,61 
 
